Family-friendly policies and employment equality: an analysis of maternity and paternity leave equalization in Spain

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Authors:

Lucía Gorjón
Imanol Lizarraga

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Fundación ISEAK

Abstract

Spain introduced the equalization of maternity and paternity leave policies at 16 weeks in January 2021, hence becoming a pioneer. We study the causal impact of this reform on labor market outcomes regarding fathers and mothers by applying a Regression Discontinuity Design with data from Social Security records. The study provides mixed to positive results of the reform on the reduction of the gender gap. Although we find a minor negative impact on treated women's probabilities of being employed 1 year after the childbirth, we specially observe an improvement in their working hours both 6 and 12 months after the birth. Meanwhile, employed men's working hours are unchanged after the birth, but their employment probability decreases in the following year. This feature is also reflected on a lower number of cumulative working days for men, but not for women. Finally, we find no significant impact on the non-paid posterior parental leave, neither for mothers nor fathers.

1. Introduction

The progressive integration of women into the labor market has been one of the defining economic trends of the last decades in the developed countries. Although Spain initially fell behind in this matter, it rapidly caught up with the neighboring societies after the transition to democracy[1]. Despite significant advance in the equalization of rights, women continue to face barriers that hinder their full participation and advancement in the workforce.

On top of other barriers, childbearing has been identified as one of the main factors behind the persisting gender differences in the labor market (Kleven et al., 2019; De Quinto et al., 2020, Kleven et al., 2023). With no appreciable disparities between working men and women prior to the first child, parenthood abruptly deepens the gender imbalance, opening a gap that persists or even widens in the medium- to long-run (Kleven et al., 2019). In Spain, the earnings child penalty for women has been estimated at 10% in the immediate year after the childbirth, widening to 28% after ten years, whereas men's earnings trend is left unaffected by paternity (De Quinto et al., 2020).

The gender earnings gap has been deemed as a reflection of both a significant drop in the likelihood of women being employed and an increase in their part-time work rates after childbirth (Ortiz-Ospina & Tzvetkova, 2017; de la Rica et al., 2021). The persistence of that gap –unaltered even with falling childbearing rates– can be directly traced back (among other causes) to an imbalance in family and household responsibilities between men and women (Farré & González, 2018). Even during the 2020 lockdown due to the Covid-19 pandemic, when both parents were mandated to stay at home, the bulk of domestic chores and family care still fell on women in Spain (Farré et al., 2021). In this regard, the aforementioned rise in women's employment rates has not been matched with an equivalent reduction in the domestic chores, which have traditionally lied within women's responsibilities[2]. Hence, rights and duties have not grown parallel, and social roles have not changed as fast as economic needs do, but they may in a near future.

Several policies have been proposed in an attempt to reduce the care gap, in order to increase women's labor force participation and labor intensity in the medium-run. Paternity/maternity leave, for instance, comprises a (oftentimes subsidized) period during which an employee (be it a man or a woman) is temporarily absent from work due to

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[1] According to data from the Spanish Institute of Statistics (INE, from its Spanish acronym), activity rates for men stood at 78% in Spain in 1976, in comparison to just 29% for women, a 49-p.p. gender-gap. In 2023, those numbers were 64% and 55% for men and women, respectively, down to a 9 p.p. activity rate gap.

[2] The 2016 European Quality of Life Survey (Eurofound, 2018) shows that 93% of women with children aged 25-49 do childcare on a daily based in the European Union, compared to 69% of men. Housework, for its part, is part of daily tasks of 78% of women but just 32% of men.

pregnancy, childbirth or the adoption of a child, encompassing to some degree the immediate care or nurturing of a newborn or adopted child (OECD Family Database, 2020).[3]

However, evidence shows that these policies could have further hindered the opportunities of women in the labor market in relation to males (Lalive & Zweimüller, 2009; Rossin-Slater et al., 2013), even though it may have been effective in increasing fertility rates (Lalive & Zweimüller, 2009). Although the effects of parental leave may be positive for short periods of time, particularly regarding family-work balance, a prolonged leave might have a negative impact on women's participation rates, human capital and wages (Kunze, 2022). The mixed results of parental leave tools could have arisen from their excessive focus on women: most of the reforms have often taken the form of longer maternity leaves (or longer parental leaves, which mostly women take advantage of), and in a minor scale, as father-specific leaves.

Hence, an asymmetrical treatment arises whenever paternity and maternity leave durations are not equal. The existence of a longer maternity leave places a disproportionate (and implicit) burden on mothers in assuming caregiving responsibilities, which can contribute to heightened fatherly disengagement and perpetuate this imbalance throughout their lives (Kunze, 2022). Similarly, companies confronted with two candidates possessing comparable résumés but differing genders may display a bias in hiring a male over a woman of childbearing age due to the legally longer maternity leave, implicitly penalizing women's careers (Duguet, Emmanuel & Loïc, 2017). Therefore, more generous family policies might have been implemented at the expense of mothers' career paths, as social roles have remained unaffected.

In this regard, the increase in paternity leaves has recently gained popularity in an effort to close the gender disparity that the childbirth carries and that voluntary parental leave policies fail to avoid (Ekberg et al., 2013; Rossin-Slater, 2017; Patnaik, 2019). The main purpose of expanding paternity leaves is to encourage partners to share the family-related responsibilities, which may more effectively increase female employment and produce more equitable outcomes among partner members by sharing the cost of childbearing (Bünning, 2015; González & Zoabi, 2021).

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[3] When paternity or maternity leave periods end, there is yet another policy that facilitates conciliation: parental leave. Available for both members of the couple, it usually offers longer non-paid or partially-paid leave periods. Parental leave policies have long been in force in most of the Western societies, especially in addition to maternity leave or as shareable parental leave. These particular policies aim at compensating the sharp increase in family responsibilities after childbirth, thus not making parents (usually women) choose between employment and family (Blau & Kahn, 2013). Due to the evidence of better family health (Beuchert et al., 2016) and socio-emotional skills improvements for children (Houmark et al., 2022), longer terms of parental leave have gained momentum as a family-friendly tool.

Nevertheless, in order to end up with the gender gap on the labor market arising from childbirth, it is a necessary condition not only to increase paternity leave, but to make paternity and maternity leave durations equal. This paper mainly addresses the question of whether this is also a sufficient condition for progress towards gender equality in the labor market.

To answer this question, we examine the case of Spain, the pioneering country in which the equalization has become effective for the first time. Since January 2021, both mothers and fathers are provided with 16 weeks of full-paid parental leave after the childbirth, individual and nonexchangeable[4]. Although other countries have implemented longer shareable and non-mandatory parental leave policies and more generous maternity leave schemes, such as Sweden, Finland or Iceland, no other European country has to our knowledge established equal mandatory maternity and paternity rights of such extent (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2022).[5]

The introduction of this policy on a specific date makes it susceptible to being studied as a natural experiment, in order to test its causal impact on gender labor equality. For the impact assessment of this paper, the date on which the extension came into effect –1st January 2021– will be used as the cut-off date for applying a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). As families of children being born just before the reform were not entitled to the extended paternity leave, and hence their subsequent trajectory was not affected by it, they could be used as a control group with which to compare the treated households, those with children born after the reform. As previous studies have underlined, the observed imbalance between men and women regarding the labor market–childbirth relation could have been made unintentionally deeper through unequal maternity and paternity leave periods. Thus, a quantitative analysis that focuses on the January 2021 extension to 16 weeks deserves special attention due to its unprecedented condition.

This paper examines whether, as a result of the last reform, gender gap into the labor market has been closed. In particular, we focus on the following outcomes: firstly, the study on mothers' increase in labor participation and work intensity 6 and 12 months after the childbirth; secondly, we pay attention to the flip side of the coin: whether men reduce their attachment to the labor market in the wake of higher household responsibilities, through a possible increase in absenteeism or a reduction in their work intensity for the same periods. On another note, we explore whether the extension of paternity leave has an impact on the

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[4] Only the first 6 weeks after the childbirth are mandatory and simultaneous for both parents, while the additional 10 weeks can be freely enjoyed within the first year of the newborn, in a simultaneous or consecutive manner. The mother can make use of this leave period 4 weeks prior to the birth.

[5] The most recent study (Nr. 3428) of the Sociological Research Center (CIS, for its Spanish acronym), focused on the perceptions about equality between men and women, points out that 91,4% of survey respondents (90.4% of men, 92.4% of women) approve of men taking the full 16 weeks paternity leave.

total working days during the next year: an increase in the number of days worked by mothers or a decrease in the case of fathers would result in a diminished gender disparity in labor force participation. Finally, we analyze the impact on the reduction in the use of non-mandatory parental leave by mothers, given that a higher involvement of fathers in the early stages of childcare may reduce the need for mothers to use them later on. Similarly, we examine if the extension of paternity leave has an effect on fathers' use of non-mandatory parental leave, possibly as a result of the reforms' aim of increased initial involvement from fathers in childcare.[6] To do so, we use the Continuous Work History Sample which includes Social Security records of a representative sample of Spanish people employed up to 2022.

The study provides mixed to positive results on the causal impact of the reform on the reduction of the gender gap. Although we find a minor negative impact on treated women's participation probabilities 1 year after the childbirth, we specially observe an improvement in their working hours both 6 months and 12 months after the birth. Meanwhile, employed men's working hours are unchanged after the birth, but their employment probabilities decrease for a time after the paternity leave equalization. This feature is also reflected on a lower number of cumulative working days for men, but not for women. As there is no significant impact on the non-paid posterior parental leave, we may assume that the reform promoted that more men temporarily leave the labor market in order to take care of their offspring. At the same time, women seem to be encouraged to increase work intensity, reducing the long-lasting scar on women's careers. In sum, the reform may have introduced some kind of negotiation and sharing at the eligible households, so that fathers adapt on the extensive margin of the labor market, whereas mothers are better off in the intensive margin. Whether the labor market-related changes have had an effective impact on men's involvement in familiar responsibilities is a question that lies out of the boundaries of the present study.

The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 2, a review of the most relevant literature is presented; in section 3, the legislation related to paternity, maternity, and parental leaves in Spain, as well as its recent modifications, are explained in detail; section 4 describes the data and the methodological strategy used in the analysis. The main results are then provided in Section 5, including a descriptive analysis for each output of interest and the evaluation of the reforms' effect on them. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the results.

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[6] This study focuses on heterosexual couples of two members, as the main issue of interest for the study is the inequality in the labor market specifically related to gender.

2. Literature review

In order to close employment gender gaps, many policies have been in place in the intersection of family-friendly and pro-labor policing in the form of maternity, paternity and parental leave. These tools are fundamentally based on both the need of compensating the increase in housework and care responsibilities after childbirth and the incentives to stay in the labor market afterwards (OECD Family Database, 2020). Hence, the main objectives of such a policy reside in the improvement of work-family balance, the promotion of gender equality at home, the encouragement of fertility and the upgrade of children's and parents' health and welfare.

Due to the fact that these family-related benefits vary on their prescriptive nature, funding and subsidized period, some crucially differential characteristics of those policies must be taken into account to establish a robust theoretical framework in which to test the above-mentioned objectives.

The characteristics of a familiar leave policy oftentimes demarcate the incentives within couples and hence, the chance of success in promoting gender equality. Depending on the imbalance between men and women, leave policies can be thus divided between those equality-impeding –when they actively allocate the responsibility on women, but not their partners–, those equality-enabling –if they consider transferable or family-level rights– and finally those equality-promoting –whenever they assign individual non-transferable rights to both men and women– (Brighouse & Wright, 2008). According to this classification, the case of Spain here under study excels at the top of the last group.

Many aspects of the policy must be taken into account. First, the results are likely to be affected depending on the direct beneficiary of the policy. Maternity and paternity leave are exclusively set aside for mothers and fathers, respectively. Although their individual positive effects have been extensively studied (Blum et al., 2023), more recently the need to set paternity leave closer to mothers' benefit has been stressed (Rossin-Slater, 2017; Kunze, 2022), as the asymmetry may have played against the intention of closing the gender gap. Parental leave, for its part, is usually assigned to the household entirely, sometimes including some periods exclusively destined to any of the partners. However, it must be written down that it is women who usually take use of this take-it-or-lose-it policy, thus leading to a more modest impact on gender equality (Olivetti & Petrongolo, 2017; Patnaik, 2019). Secondly, the mandatory or voluntary nature of the policy considerably varies its coverage, especially among men. Thus, maternity and paternity leave, which oftentimes include a mandatory period just after the childbirth, reach a higher coverage than parental leave, a take-it-or-lose-it oriented policy. Thirdly, and in relation to the aforementioned mandatory nature, the transferability of unused benefits to the other partners might play against women, as they tend to take use of both their entitled leave rights and those transferable from their partner. Fourth, whether the leave is fully-/partially-/non-paid highly influences household-decisions, due to the change in earnings that a non-funded leave

supposes. In this sense, the lower-pay partner might be incentivized to temporarily or definitively leave the labor market, leading to a specialization between work and housework/care. With fully-funded generous schemes, evidence shows that too prolonged leave periods may hinder women's return to work (Olivetti & Petrongolo, 2017). Lastly, the possibility of obtaining parental leave simultaneously or separately by each partner, significantly determines whether there will be a deeper involvement of men before the leave and the probabilities of women returning to their previous jobs (at least to a job at the same level).

Taken all those considerations into account, extensive research has been conducted to estimate the impact of different leave policies on gender equality, labor market performance, fertility or long-term earnings (Olivetti & Petrongolo, 2017).

Regarding the first topic, leave policy aims at reducing gender inequalities in childcare by increasing fathers' involvement in the care of newborns, with the intention of changing the assigned roles and level out the ground (O'Brien & Wall, 2017).

Actually, it has been demonstrated that prolonging paternity leave in some countries increases fathers' participation (McKinsey, 2021). A greater involvement of fathers in childbearing may also influence employer decisions regarding the employment and promotion of women, thereby decreasing gender disparities on the labor market (Farré & González, 2018). Therefore, this reform seeks to have different effects on the labor market: first, that fathers work less during the first year due to a greater participation in childcare to the detriment of some working days; secondly, to reduce the labor sacrifice that mothers make when having children because the childcare responsibilities fall mainly on them (Zilloniz, 2017; Altuzarra et al., 2020; Del Boca et al., 2020). This sacrifice is reflected in several ways, such as mothers retiring from the labor market or reducing the working hours to reconcile work and family life (Zilloniz, 2017; Campero et al., 2020). Despite the rising incidence of paternity leave, it is unclear whether fathers respond to the binding constraints or the effects they produce (Patnaik, 2019). Also unclear is the indirect effect on mothers (Evertsson, 2016; González & Zoabi, 2021). Specifically, the purpose of this paper is to shed light on the effects of a reform along these lines that was a first of its kind.

Some papers query whether paternity leave time reserved exclusively for fathers is sufficient for fathers to make use of it. According to Rege & Solli (2013) for Norway and Ekberg et al. (2013) for Sweden, it causes an increment in the number of fathers who use it. In Sweden, the exclusive reservation of four paid weeks for fathers increased the proportion of fathers taking parental leave from 3% to 60%. However, 40% of fathers did still not utilize it, even when it was paid for. In the case of Sweden, one daddy month with compensation between 75% and 80% of the salary resulted in an increase of 15 days in fathers' use (around 50%), although some of these days were used to extend holidays (using during the summertime and around Christmas). In addition to that, the authors find no effect on parental involvement in childcare. In contrast, Cools et al. (2015), who also evaluate the Norway reform, find a

positive impact on children's school performance, especially in households where the father has a higher level of education than the mother, as a result of a greater parent involvement in his children's education. Regarding the five-week paid parental leave for fathers in Quebec, Patnaik (2016) finds that fathers' participation in child care and domestic work increases, thereby diminishing sex specialization long after the leave period. Specifically, she concludes that small changes in the initial parenting experience can have long-lasting effects on the behavior of parents in later years. In the case of Germany, Kluve and Tamm (2012) find that two daddy months are not reflected in significant changes in the time fathers devote to childcare. However, later on, Tamm (2018) concludes that the same parental leave reform has a significant impact on the time fathers devote to childcare and reduces gender differences in housework, with an effect that persist even after fathers return from leave. However, the effect of the reform strongly depends on whether they have had children before the reform, also concluding that the first months after birth are crucial in defining gender roles in childcare and in household production. In addition, according to Bünning (2015), fathers who took more than two months of leave or were on leave while their partner was working increased their participation in household responsibilities. Farré & González (2018) have evaluated the effects of the 2007 Spanish reform which requires fathers to take two weeks of paid paternity leave just after the birth of a child, and they find persistent effects on fathers' involvement reported spending more time on childcare.

Regarding the impact on employment that different leaves have had for both mothers and fathers, there is also an abundance of evidence. In the case of Spain, Farré & González (2018) also address this question and find no effects on fathers' labor market outcomes, but higher employment rates for mothers six months after childbirth.[7] More general, numerous meta-analyses have been conducted in an attempt to figure out this question. Analyzing nine European countries between 1969 and 1993, Ruhm (1996) concludes that parental leave is associated with increases in women's employment. In addition, Akgunduz & Plantenga (2012) examine the effects of parental leave legislation on the labor market outcomes of women in 16 European countries between 1970 and 2010, finding that increases in women's participation rates diminish with the length and generosity of leave programs. While women's labor force participation does not increase significantly, there is substantial evidence of an increase in weekly working hours. Finally, they detect a decline in high-skilled women's wages and occupational segregation.

However, the labor consequences of parental leaves are heterogeneous when comparing particular cases in different countries and regions. For example, Regi & Solli (2013) find that four weeks in Norwegian paternity leave during the child's first year decreases fathers' future earnings and the effect persists over time. But Cool et al (2015) find no evidence that paternal quota in Norway affects the traditional allocation of parents' labor supply, neither in fathers' work hours and yearly earnings, nor in an increase in mothers' labor market

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[7] The database they used is identical to the one used in this article. In addition, they also apply an RDD methodology for identifying the causal nature of policy effects.

attachment. Moreover, Austrian reform, which increased the duration of parental leave from one to two years significantly reduced mother's return to work, as well as decreased their earnings in the short run but not in the long run (Lalive & Zweimüller, 2009). In Quebec, Patnaik (2016) shows that daddy months increases maternal employment, while fathers' employment is not significantly affected. In the case of Sweden, Evertsson (2016) finds negative wage impacts of paternity leave that falls mainly on women with higher levels of education. Moreover, the longer the duration of leave, the greater the penalty; for men, the negative wage effect is more immediate, but the increase is lower with the length of parental leave. Finally, in Germany, Kluve & Tamm (2012) find a significant decrease in the likelihood of mothers returning to work during the first year after giving birth and an increase in the likelihood of mothers returning to work after the parental leave period expires. More recently, Tamm (2018) finds that the effects of paternity leave on employment are relatively small: while mothers increase their working hours, fathers decrease theirs; however, the reduction of fathers' hours of work is similar from the increase of mothers' working hours, indicating that the labor supply of the couple remains more or less the same.

Recent empirical studies also show that paternity leave affects family decisions, although the evidence is also heterogeneous regarding the likelihood of separation and fertility across countries (González & Zoabi, 2021; Avdic & Karimi, 2018; Farré & González, 2019; Cools et al., 2015; Kotsadam & Finseraas, 2011; Bartel et al., 2018; Fontenay & Tojerow, 2020; and Olafsson & Steingrimsdottir, 2020).

In summary, even when paid, take-it-or-lose-it leaves for fathers have varied effects on fathers' involvement in caregiving with their subsequent heterogeneous effects for the mothers and fathers' employment outcomes. In broad terms, the evidence suggests that the fathers' involvement in childcare is greater either (i) the closer to the childbirth fathers take leave or (ii) if it is consecutive and not simultaneous to the mother's leave. Additionally, the longer mothers take off from work to care for their children, the more negative labor consequences they experience, both in terms of their likelihood of returning to work and their wages, with a wage penalty particularly affecting those with a higher level of education. Furthermore, for mothers who continue to work, there is evidence of an increase in their weekly working hours. Little effect is observed for fathers, particularly due to their limited use of leave (even paid). Only in Sweden and Norway there is a minor negative impact on the wages of those who take parental leave, as well as in Germany, where there is also a reduction in working hours for fathers similar to the increase of their female partners' hours. As a conclusion, the research suggests that the design of policies is essential to the employment results of both mothers and fathers, and therefore, its influence on gender inequalities in both caregiving and employment.

3. The Spanish reform in the international context

Spain has the longest equal non-transferable and mandatory paternity and maternity leaves in the world, at 16 weeks for both men and women. A brief review of European level parental leave policies can help identify the myriad of different implementation perspectives and the position of vanguard that Spain has gained through the reform under study (Blum et al., 2023).

As of 2022, women still receive overall a significantly longer maternity leave than men in the majority of countries (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2022). This leave may be paid or unpaid, and its duration varies significantly by country. Ireland and Bulgaria, for instance, who have implemented the most generous maternity leave policies, offer women up to 42 and 58 weeks of leave, respectively, with a fixed monthly amount of pay in the first case and 90% of the previous salary in the second. However, it must be noted down that most of it is of non-mandatory nature. Among less generous countries, such as Spain and Austria, maternity leave for 16 weeks with full remuneration is provided, even if only 6 weeks are of mandatory character for the first country.

Regarding paternity leave, only very recent steps have been taken to try to bring fathers' and mothers' rights closer, considering the potential negative impact of an asymmetrical treatment. On average, the duration of the leave exclusively allocated to fathers is much shorter than the maternity leave, if it exists at all: Germany, Croatia, Luxembourg, and Slovakia, for instance, do not offer paternity leave; in Hungary and Malta, the duration is one week (paid at 100 percent), and in Finland it can last up to nine weeks (with variable remuneration based on the income). Hence, Spain has implemented the longest –100% paid– mandatory paternity leave in the European Union, as well as among the developed economies, at 16 weeks (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2022; Koslowski et al., 2022; Blum et al., 2023). Other factors to consider are whether the parental leave is mandatory (in some countries it is in its entirety, in others a minimum is required, and the remainder is voluntary, and in others it is entirely voluntary) and whether both the mother and father can take it at the same time.

There is yet another public policy tool that facilitates the conciliation of work and family life balance: the parental leave. A leave-period that can be used by both parents, it can take place following the maternity and paternity leaves, as in the case of Estonia or Spain, or instead of it, as in Portugal or Sweden. In some countries, parental leave is paid –at least, partially–, while in others, only the position is retained. In neither case can parental leave be compulsory. According to the available evidence, even though either parent could use

paternity leave, the majority of parental leave is taken by mothers. For example, in the case of Spain, 92,7% of paternity leaves are taken by mothers.[8]

As previously mentioned, this paper evaluates the effective equalization of maternity and paternity leaves in Spain, being set at 16 weeks since January 2021. As shown in figure 1, while the duration of maternity leave in Spain has remained unchanged at 16 weeks since 1989, paternity leave has been progressively incremented, from four days to two weeks in 2007, subsequently to four and five weeks in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Since 2019, paternity leave has again gradually risen, until the final equalization of maternity and paternity leave in January 2021. The study of just the last reform is of special interest due to its ground-breaking status in international terms.

FIGURE 1. PATERNITY AND MATERNITY LEAVE DURATION IN SPAIN (IN WEEKS)

The Spanish system of family leave policy has some idiosyncrasies that deserve to be examined. Firstly, out of the 16 weeks provided for each partner, only the first 6 weeks after the birth are completely mandatory for men and women. The remaining 10 weeks comprise a take-it-or-lose-it benefit that can be taken advantage of within the first year of the newborn.

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[8] For more details regarding maternity, paternity and parental leaves, see European Parliament (2022). Additionally, Rossin-Slater (*Maternity and family leave policy,* 2017), Koslowski et al (*18th International Review of Leave Policies and Related Research*, 2022) and Blum et al (*19th International Review of Leave Policies and Related Research*, 2023) make a global comparison of maternity and family leaves around the world, explaining all their dimensions in detail.

The leave must be exercised in minimum periods of one week, in a consecutive or nonconsecutive manner. Women can use 4 weeks of the additional leave period immediately before the birth. Both parents can be on leave at the same time or in alternate periods.

Secondly, the paternity and the maternity leave are fully funded by the Social Security system of Spain at 100% of the current wage. Hence, the earnings of the household are covered in the short-run, which may incentivize that partners do not specialize further after the childbirth.

Thirdly, after the 16 weeks of paternity or maternity leave are consumed, both fathers and mothers are entitled to an additional breastfeeding leave. It offers the possibility of taking one daily hour of leave at work until the newborn's 9th month, which can be split into two half-an-hour periods or be accumulated just after the mandatory parental leave extinguishes. As opposed to the Social Security funded leave, this policy must be covered by the employer.

Additionally, and besides the Social Security funded paternity and maternity leave, the Spanish Workers' Charter contemplates the figure of a non-paid voluntary parental leave, of which parents can individually make use in the first 3 years after the childbirth. It means that the worker's position is maintained for the first year, and an occupation-level equivalent job is guaranteed from then on until the 3rd year threshold. Of a different nature than the full-funded leave policy, this parental leave (excedencia, in Spanish) is regarded as part of workers' rights, and not as a specific public policy. However, its use has been widely extended for years.

4. Methodology

4.1. Database

To estimate the impact of the equalization of paternity and maternity leave policies in Spain, we use administrative data from the Continuous Work History Sample (from this point forward CWHS, coming from the Spanish Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales) corresponding to the year 2023. The CWHS is yearly released by the Spanish Social Security and refers to data collected the year before. Therefore, the use of the CWHS' 2023 edition provides information of people employed up to 2022, as well as their historic records.

The CWHS comprises a random extraction of –mainly work-related– data from 4% of all Spanish individuals registered in the databases of the Social Security, be it workers, the unemployed receiving benefits, or retirees. This randomized, publicly available and anonymized data provides an historic record of an unbiased representative sample of the

Spanish labor force, including the individuals' detailed past records since they first joined the labor market. In particular, data from the types of contracts, modifications of contract, dates of beginning and end (if applicable), sector, public vs private employment information, size of the employer, region of residence, seniority in a job or part-time coefficients, among others, are presented.

Some limitations that arise from the structure of the database must be also taken into account. Although the paternity and maternity leaves are not directly identified in the database –as they do not interrupt the contract–, it can at least be assumed that fathers and mothers must stay at home the first 6 weeks after the childbirth, due to the mandatory character of the policy. Subsequent non-mandatory parental leave, on the contrary, is perfectly identifiable in the database, as it comprises an employment-related benefit, including beginning and end dates and its duration.

Furthermore, the CWHS offers sociodemographics regarding the individual –such as sex, age or nationality– and the household, as it gets information from the census, which includes the date of birth and the gender of the rest of members of the household.[9] Specifically, dates of birth of children are traceable. Therefore, workers that endure a childbearing process are precisely identifiable. As the reform was set in place at a concrete date, 1st January 2021, the CWHS allows to assign workers to the treated or control groups. Working men and women who had a child just before that date will be assigned to the control group –as they are not eligible for the new mandatory leave scheme–, while those who endured childbearing after January 2021 will comprise the treatment group. On another note, data from members of the household does not allow to recognize couples, as there is no information regarding the relationship between members. For that reason, the analysis restricts to adults who cohabit with another adult of the opposite gender (in addition to the newborn).[10] All in all, men and women who live together and have children might be assumed to be partners.

Therefore, the sample for the analysis covers all the people in the database cohabiting with their couple that hold a salaried-employment when their child is born, specifically between January 2020 and December 2021 (one year before and after the entry into force of the leave reform in January 2021). As the precise day of birth is unknown (only the year and month are included), we set the 15th of the previous month as a reference point in time to

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[9] The CWHS also includes an education-level variable. However, this information arises from the census, which is not frequently updated. Therefore, the information regarding the education-level is often outdated, and its use for academic purposes is strongly advised against by the Spanish statistical institutions. For more information, see the Guidelines of Use of the 2022 CWHS.

[10] Given that it is a random 4% sample, unfortunately, the database does not allow for the identification of the employment history of both individuals in the household. Nevertheless, we assume that both identified mothers and fathers are representative of the Spanish society.

identify working fathers and mothers and their employment characteristics. In this sense, some control variables need to be specified, in order to separate potential policy impact effects from different sociodemographic characteristics. In particular, we make use of the following control variables: age, nationality, region of residence, type of contract right prior to the childbirth, seniority in that employment, sector of activity, size of the firm and whether it belongs to the public or private sectors.

Ultimately, men and women are separately studied to check for gender differences of the policy impact.

4.2. Estimation strategy

The equalization of paternity and maternity leave after January 2021 in Spain acts as a natural experiment, which permits to compare outcomes of parents with children born just before the reform – the control group– and just after it – the treatment group–, following previous studies that have applied similar approaches, Ekberg et al. (2013) for Sweden, Kluve & Tamm (2012) for Germany and Farré & González (2019) in Spain (previous reforms).

In particular, we follow a Regression Discontinuity Design (from now on, RDD), a widely used method for causal inference and impact evaluation of policies (Cattaneo & Titiunik, 2022). The adequacy of this methodology for causal hypothesis testing has been thoroughly discussed since it was first proposed (Van der Klaauw, 2008; Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; Cattaneo & Titiunik, 2022). This method is based on the existence of a clear cutoff point over a running variable (sometimes also called score), which alters the eligibility to a certain policy or intervention. As the probability of being treated abruptly changes from 0 to 1 just at the cutoff, the causal impact of that change on an outcome can be rigorously estimated. Other causal frameworks assume that treatment and control groups can't be simultaneously observed –the classical problem of lack of common support–, thus treatment effects are more difficult to estimate. The continuity assumption in a RDD, however, means that the running variable is continuously distributed (and continuous at the cutoff), so that both treated and control groups would exhibit a similar behavior in the absence of the treatment (Hahn et al., 2001; Cattaneo & Titiunik, 2022). This particularity allows for the estimation of the average treatment effect[11], but only in the near neighborhood of the cutoff. Because of this "jump" at the limit, the RDD can only be applied at a very local level, hence comparing the future outcomes of workers who were parents just above and below the cutoff (Cattaneo & Titiunik, 2022). For purely practical guidelines, we follow Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik (2019, 2023), who offer a comprehensive perspective of the implementation of RDD studies.

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[11] The probability of being treated after the cutoff is exactly 1, because both fathers and mothers of newborn babies are mandated to stay at home for 6 weeks after the childbirth.

For the case under study, the date of birth of children comprises the continuous running variable –we use months as an approach–, while the equalization of paternity and maternity leaves on January 2021 represents the cutoff. As previously noted, we test the causal impact of the policy reform on different outcomes: First of all, on the proportion of men and women with a salaried employment (be it in the same job or in a different position) compared to those in a non-employment episode.[12] Second, on the proportion of men and women who reduce their hours worked. We approximate this outcome through a variable that identifies the part-time coefficient in percentage points, where higher numbers relate to full-time jobs and lower figures imply shorter working shifts and part-time jobs. Our dependent variable takes a value of 1 when the part-time coefficient is reduced, and it takes a value of 0 if it remains equal or increases.[13] Therefore, the outcome will address working hour reductions, and not only full-time to part-time transition[14]. Again, this transition might be observed in the same job that the individual had prior to the childbirth or in a different post. The impact of the equalization on the aforementioned outcomes will be tested at different time-horizons after the childbirth. Both will be measured 6 months after the childbirth –once the paternity/maternity leave, the breastfeeding leave and even the legal vacation period finish– and 12 months after the childbirth, when the return to employment must have taken place.

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[12] Self-employed workers are excluded from the calculations since they often exhibit a distinct employment structure compared to salaried employees, with greater flexibility in working hours and conditions. The inclusion of self-employed individuals may introduce additional variability in the data unrelated to the equalization of leaves. This could compromise the internal validity of the study by complicating the attribution of observed effects solely to the equalization of leaves.

[13] We do so because there is no clear cut-off point to differentiate full-time and part-time jobs, as typical full-time employment working hours significantly vary from the public to the private sector, and between private economic sectors in Spain. According to the Spanish Labour Force Survey of the Spanish National Statistics Institute for year 2021 Q1, full-time salaried employees in the private sector worked 40 hours per week on average, while those in the public sector worked 37 hours per week. Additionally, almost 80% of all public full-time employees worked between 30 and 37,5 weekly hours, whereas 87% of private full-time employees worked more than 37,5 weekly hours. In this sense, assigning the full-time category to workers in the public or private sectors depending on any threshold would be arbitrary and misleading.

[14] This metric for the working hours allows us to include a diverse range of different cases, such as employees who reduce their working time but keep their full-time jobs –for instance, the public sector often offers such flexible arrangements–, employees who modify their full-time contract into a (temporary) part-time arrangement in order to take care of children, or even those who used to work part-time prior to the childbirth but further decrease their working-hours afterwards.

This entails utilizing data from the CWHS up to December 2022, the latest available data as of the current date.

Our third outcome of interest is the cumulative days of work one year after the childbirth. Since the utilized periods of maternity or paternity leave are not identified in the database, as previously explained, differences in cumulative working days over the following year refer to periods distinct from those associated with such leaves. These differences may encompass episodes of non-paid parental leave, unemployment, inactivity, or transitions between employments. Fourthly, we study the impact on the percentage of parents that take voluntary non-paid parental leave (the so-called excedencias) after the Social-Security subsidized leave extinguishes as well. Regarding this variable, we capture the impact on any point of the whole sample (until December 2022).[15]

As control variables for both the treatment and control groups we use age (<30, 30-35, 36-40, >40), nationality (natives vs foreigners), region of residence (the 17 Spanish Autonomous Regions and the two Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla[16]), type of contract right prior to the childbirth (indefinite full-time, indefinite part-time, temporary full-time, temporary part-time), seniority in that employment (<1 year, 1-5 years, >5 years), sector of activity (10 aggregated sectors), size of the firm (<10 employees, 10-50 employees, >50 employees) and whether it belongs to the public or private sectors. These controls account for sociodemographic effects that can interfere in the estimation.

The basic equation that we estimate is the following:

$$\textbf{Equation (1)} \quad Y_{id} = \alpha + \beta T_{id} + \gamma f(d) + \delta X_{id} + \varepsilon_{id}$$

where Y represents the four outcomes under study (% of salaried workers, % of working-hours reduction, number of cumulative working days in the following year and % of workers who take parental leave) for each individual i and each birth date d (with is centered to 0 for January 2021), T_{id} is a binary treatment indicator, i.e., a 1 or 0 indicator of whether the birth

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[15] Families having children in the last months of 2021 might not have had enough time to take the parental leave, however, the use of a Regression Discontinuity Design, which estimates the *LATE* near the cutoff should avoid this fact by focusing on similar households and periods of time.

[16] We use information of all Spanish regions but for the Basque Country, where the regional government came ahead of time by implementing a policy resembling the national equalization reform one year before the rest of the country.

took place before or after January 2021, f(d) is a polynomial of the running variable of diverse and Xid includes the matrix of control variables.

As previously introduced, the RDD allows for an estimation of local causal effects around the cutoff point. On account for this, the selection of the optimal bandwidth around the cutoff is a decisive choice (Cattaneo & Vazquez-Bare, 2016). With a high enough number of observations in the neighborhood of the cutoff, a narrower bandwidth would yield more accurate estimation results.[17]

In order to check for data manipulation, we finally implement additional robustness checks with different bandwidths and changes in the functional form of the regression specification both before and after the reform. Firstly, we regress an interaction between the treatment indicator and the cutoff, so that the change in the slope might be tested:

$$\textbf{Equation (2)} \quad Y_{id} = \alpha + \gamma_1 f(d)T_{id} + \delta X_{id} + \varepsilon_{id}$$

Secondly, we apply a non-lineal (quadratic) specification:

$$\textbf{Equation (3)} \quad Y_{id} = \alpha + \beta T_{id} + \gamma_1 f(d) + \gamma_2 f(d)T_{id} + \delta X_{id} + \varepsilon_{id}$$

Thirdly, we repeat the previous specifications with different bandwidths:

$$\textbf{Equation (4)} \quad Y_{id} = \alpha + \beta T_{id} + \gamma_1 f(d) + \gamma_2 f(d)T_{id} + \delta X_{id} + \varepsilon_{id}$$

The previous manipulation exercises will help provide robust estimates that do not depend on the selected bandwidth, the chosen specification or the inclusion of some control variables.

4.3. Estimation justification

The choice of a Regression Discontinuity Design is suitable for the case under study only if the continuity assumption holds at the cutoff. For that matter, there should not be (i) any sorting of births around the threshold, and (ii) statistically significant differences between treatment and control groups (the treatment does not alter the characteristics of both groups, an identification problem which would point out to issues of randomization).

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[17] Here we apply the data-driven algorithmic method for selection of the optimal bandwidth included in the *rdrobust* package for R or Stata. This methodology, developed by Calonico, Cattaneo & Farrell (2020), offers robust bias-corrected inference, which provides more robust results than a mean square error (MSE) optimal bandwidth choice.

In relation to the first issue, due to the fact that the reform was not publicly announced until late stages of the political talks, there is probably no timed strategic behavior of parents (trying to delay childbearing in order to be eligible for the new leave scheme, for instance). Therefore, a random distribution between the control and treatment groups can be assumed (McCrary, 2008). This basic assumption is tested below.

An illustrative figure on the monthly births evolution for the studied period is provided (Figure 2), where the vertical line identifies the introduction of the leave reform in Spain.

FIGURE 2. MONTHLY EVOLUTION OF CHILDBIRTHS IN WORKERS' HOUSEHOLDS

Births prior to January 2021 are smoothed backward, those before that date are smoothed forward (three-month moving average).

As previously addressed, control and treatment groups are sorted by the cutoff point that represents the introduction of the reform. On a visual basis, a similar distribution of births below and above the threshold apparently discard the possibility of some bunching of the births around the cutoff having happened, apart from some seasonality. This hypothesis is further tested by running regressions as Eq. (1), where the outcome variable is substituted by the number of monthly births (as well as the log of monthly births) and different bandwidths are considered. The results on these regressions are reported in Annex 1 (Table

A1) and show that there is indeed no statistically significant discontinuity on the distribution of average monthly births. Thus, we discard the possibility of sorting of births around the discontinuity.

Secondly, the balance of treatment and control groups on their sociodemographic and labor-related characteristics is directly demonstrable by testing for statistically significant differences. As initially stated, individuals in the database are assigned to the treatment and control groups depending on their parenthood status before or after the cutoff. Therefore, the main assumption is that there should be no significant differences between groups. In a first step, the balanced tables of the control variable for each group and the whole sample are presented in Annex 2 (Tables A2.1 and A2.2). These include the descriptive statistics of control variables for men and women belonging to the control and treatment groups, as well as mean comparison tests as a measure of contrast. Indeed, there are only minor significant differences between few of the control variables.

In a second step, in order to test whether those differences still hold close to the cutoff, the balance assumption is tested by applying individual regressions resembling Eq. (1) on each sociodemographic and labor-related control variable for fathers and mothers. The complete results of the estimations are summarized in Annex 3 (Tables A3.1 and A3.2). As proved, there are no overall significant discontinuities on the control variables, with only few significative point estimates that do not hold when changing the bandwidth.

In sum, the non-existence of bunching at the cutoff and a balanced sample both support the main assumption that allows for a Regression Discontinuity Design, which is hence presented below.

5. Results

We move on to the main study of the causal impact of the equalization of paternity and maternity leave policies on our four outputs: employment participation and work intensity (6 and 12 months after the childbirth), cumulative working days one year after the birth and use of parental leave, separately for women and men.

5.1. Employment participation

Paternity and maternity leave equalization is oriented towards a better balance between men and women regarding family responsibilities. In this sense, the policy aims at incentivizing that the increment in housework and care after the childbirth be potentially shared, with two concurring results: (i) women going back to the labor market in a shorter term than before, and (ii) men reducing their participation probabilities as a result. The return

to the labor market is measured through the employment participation rate of salaried individuals in each of the indicated moments of time after the childbirth.

Figure 3 plots the employment participation of mothers and fathers from the treatment and control groups 6 and 12 months after the birth of their children.

FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGE OF SALARIED EMPLOYEES IN RELATION TO THEIR SALARIED STATUS PRIOR TO CHILDBIRTH

Both men and women observe a decrease in participation rates after the childbirth, however, women's employment rates fall deeper: 6 months after the birth, three out of four women are still employed, for almost nine out of ten men. After one year, it must be noted that participation rates steadily increase among mothers up from their minimum levels, while they stay constant among men (and they even slightly decrease). Additionally, while, at a descriptive level, a slight increase in the employment rate is observed in the treatment group compared to the control group for both women and men (6 and 12 months after the childbirth), this cannot be currently attributed to the causal effect of the reform. To address this, the following estimations are developed using the RDD methodology.

A summary of the main regression results is displayed in Table 1. Starting with a simple regression on the outcome using the treatment status as independent variable (1), we run five different specifications that provide robust estimates, as presented in Section 4.2: (2) includes all the control variables, (3) counts with an interaction between the running variable and the treatment status as well, which allows to determine whether, apart from the discontinuity at the cutoff, there has been a potential change in the slope, (4) repeats the

previous exercises by relaxing the linearity of the regression, thus allowing for higher order polynomials, (5) increases the bandwidth as a manipulation test. Table 1 presents the estimated coefficients and standard deviations of the treatment status. The complete regression results are provided in Annex 4 (Tables A4.1 and A4.2).

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF THE ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT PROBABILITY FOR WOMEN AND MEN

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Specifications	Simple	(1) + covariates	(2) + slope change	(2) + non-lineal	(2) + bw*2
Mothers					
Employment probability 6 months after childbirth	-0.0464 (0.0295)	-0.0466 (0.0290)	-0.0412 (0.0315)	-0.0509 (0.0444)	0.0166 (0.0204)
Employment probability 12 months after childbirth	-0.0432* (0.0259)	-0.0433* (0.0252)	-0.0588** (0.0270)	-0.0546** (0.0261)	0.00768 (0.0179)
Fathers					
Employment probability 6 months after childbirth	-0.0236 (0.0200)	-0.0317* (0.0192)	-0.0443** (0.0225)	-0.0411** (0.0208)	-0.00442 (0.0136)
Employment probability 12 months after childbirth	-0.0217 (0.0174)	-0.0305* (0.0167)	-0.0343** (0.0174)	-0.0327* (0.0169)	-0.0215* (0.0118)

We show a summary of the marginal effects of the policy introduction on the outcome variables. As covariates, we include all the aforementioned control variables, from sociodemographics to firm- and employee-related variables.

The results point out that the introduction of the equalization of paternity and maternity leave policies in Spain has decreased employment rates for both men and women after 12 months of the childbirth. On one side, there are no significant differences between control and treated women 6 months after the childbirth. 12 months in the future, however, employment probabilities of treated women are 4% to 6% lower than those from control women. These results hold for the different specifications proposed and are locally robust, as any significant effect tends to diminish when applying wider bandwidths. On the other side, the impact on men's employment status is more modest, but even 6 months after the childbirth, men's probability of being employed has been reduced from 3% to 4% due to the policy reform. 12 months after childbirth, these effects are somehow smaller, around 3%, but still significant.

As results show, the reform might have altered households' share of time between employment and family responsibilities in the short-run. Even though treated women's employment probability is also lower –which may be in line with the hypothesis that longer maternity leave policies do not necessarily improve women's employment attainment (Lalive & Zweimüller, 2009; Akgunduz & Plantenga, 2012; Kluve & Tamm, 2012)–, the policy confirms that longer father-oriented leaves do indeed affect the behavior of men. To prove

whether fathers are actually more involved in care and family chores is not the aim of the present study, while it must be noted that a rebalance of men's and women's responsibilities might positively impact their career and family choices in the medium- to long-run.

5.2. Work intensity

Up to the moment, the study has focused on the possibility that parents (temporarily) abandon the labor market as a response to a rise in responsibilities deriving from childbirth. Nevertheless, financial and career restrictions might not leave that option up for discussion. A reduction in working hours, via a request of in-job voluntary reduction or the choice of a part-time job has traditionally been the solution chosen by families (mostly women) who do not dissociate from the labor market. As part-time work is highly associated with lower pay and more modest careers, a better balance between men and women could help diminish the gender gap in the labor market. For that purpose, the policy hereby studied mainly aims at involving fathers in childcare responsibilities, in order to (1) avoid women to feel compelled to work part-time as family responsibilities rise and (2) make men better share household responsibilities, thus leading to a reduction in their work intensity.

Figure 4 presents the percentage of mothers and fathers that have reduced their work intensity 6 and 12 months after the birth (as described in Section 4.2) for both control and treatment groups.

FIGURE 4. PERCENTAGE OF SALARIED EMPLOYEES WITH WORKING HOURS REDUCTION IN RELATION TO THEIR STATUS PRIOR TO CHILDBIRTH

In addition to the gap in employment rates, women also tend to reduce their working hours in a higher proportion than men, both in the control and treatment groups. 6 months after childbirth, more than 3% of women in both groups have reduced their working hours, for just 1,6%-2,1% of men. 12 months in the future, this situation stresses, as up to 7%-8% of women work fewer hours than before the birth of a child, more than three times men's numbers. In addition to the gender gaps, it could be noted that there are indeed positive differences between treatment and the control groups, which may point out to a significant impact of the policy in this regard. To answer this question, a summary of estimations results is presented below (complete results can be found in Annex 4 (Tables A4.3 and A4.4).

In order to test those differences, we apply the previous estimation process on the coefficient of working hours reduction by following the same method as with the employment rates. Again, a summary of relevant results is shown in Table 2, while complete estimations are provided in Annex 3.

Estimation results summarized in Table 2 show that the implementation of the policy has mostly affected women by increasing their working hours (or reducing the reduction). Specifically, 6 months after childbirth, the probability of working hours reduction diminished by 4%-6% among women. At the 12 months threshold, the impact is even higher, up to 8%. Regarding men, there has been no effect of the policy on their working hours, just a small significant impact that disappears when controlling for other covariates. Consequently, the gender gap in the reduction of working hours associated with the arrival of children has been slightly narrowed due to the implementation of this policy. Therefore, at the same time that the policy contributes to fathers balancing their work-family equilibrium, it also allows for women to work more hours, with its potential positive impact on their future careers.

TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF THE ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE WORKING HOURS REDUCTION FOR WOMEN AND MEN

Specifications	(1) Simple	(2) (1) + covariates	(3) (2) + slope change	(4) (2) + non- lineal	(5) (2) + bw*2
Mothers					
Working hours reduction 6 months after childbirth	-0.0406** (0.0203)	-0.0408** (0.0206)	-0.0672** (0.0292)	-0.0529** (0.0253)	-0.0226 (0.0142)
Working hours reduction 12 months after childbirth	-0.00693** (0.0282)	-0.0665** (0.0283)	-0.0869** (0.0410)	-0.0806** (0.0350)	-0.0258 (0.0202)
Fathers					
Working hours reduction 6 months after childbirth	-0.0173* (0.0102)	-0.0145 (0.00101)	-0.00777 (0.0154)	-0.0108 (0.0128)	-0.00436 (0.00793)
Working hours reduction 12 months after childbirth	-0.0230** (0.0112)	-0.0177 (0.0108)	-0.0108 (0.0120)	-0.0118 (0.0112)	0.00515 (0.00762)

We show a summary of the marginal effects of the policy introduction on the outcome variables. As covariates, we include all the aforementioned control variables, from sociodemographics to firm- and employee-related variables.

5.3. Cumulative working days

It has been proved that the equalization of paternity and maternity leaves has altered mothers' and fathers' behavior 6 and 12 months after the childbirth. However, it may have been the case that those results conceal more nuanced trajectories, as it is to be tested whether women have effectively been more attached to the labor market in the interim. In that sense, an analysis of how many working days men and women endure in the following year after childbirth can contribute to a better understanding of their employment-related behavior in the short-run.

We firstly include in Figure 5 the total cumulative working days of men and women in the year following the childbirth. As explained, these numbers do not discount the 16 weeks leave – as this policy does not interrupt the employment–, but only non-employment periods after the leave.

FIGURE 5. TOTAL CUMULATIVE WORKING DAYS

As we observe, women consistently work less days as men do. While differences between control and treatment groups are small (around 2-3 days), fathers worked 23-24 days more than women. Hence, at a descriptive level the policy introduction does not seem to have fundamentally altered their careers.

To test this result, we run estimations on the cumulative working days just as we did with employment and working hours reduction probability. A summary is presented in Table 3, with full results being available in Annex 4 (Table A4.5).

TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF THE ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE CUMULATIVE WORKING DAYS FOR WOMEN AND MEN ONE YEAR AFTER THE CHILDBIRTH

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Specifications	Simple	(1) + covariates	(2) + slope change	(2) + non-lineal	(2) + bw*2
Mothers					
Cumulative working days 12 months after childbirth	-9.880 (7.167)	-9.463 (6.817)	-12.17 (7.837)	-11.53 (7.284)	3.151 (4.882)
Fathers					
Cumulative working days 12 months after childbirth	-4.586 (4.435)	-7.161* (3.989)	-9.593** (4.281)	-8.778** (4.107)	-0.113 (2.831)

We show a summary of the marginal effects of the policy introduction on the outcome variables. As covariates, we include all the aforementioned control variables, from sociodemographics to firm- and employee-related variables.

Estimation results show that –in line with the finds related to employment rates–, the policy has indeed managed to reduce men's total working days at around 7 to 9 days per year, with no equivalent increment in women's employment. Therefore, there is no proof of a closer relation of mothers to the labor market after childbirth, while the results point out to a progressive widening of the gender gap and a change in the behavior and work-family balance of fathers in Spain, although still far from real parity.

5.4. Parental leave

Estimations have validated the hypothesis that the equivalization policy has moderately helped balance men's and women's family responsibilities in the short-run. However, the mechanisms through which that policy has led to men working less days has not been fully explained. As previously introduced, childcare responsibilities do not disappear after 16 weeks of leave, so that other tools must step in and compensate the progressive return of fathers and mothers to the labor market. Parental leave has traditionally been on the table –but almost always just for women–. With more men delaying their return to employment and the positive attachment effects proposed in other academic work (Bünning, 2015; González & Zoabi, 2021), it may well be the case that lower employment probability for men be related to an increase in parental leave (with a corresponding decrease among women).

In that direction, we lastly provide an analysis on the impact of the policy on the use of voluntary non-paid parental leave after the subsidized period and until the last months available in the sample. We begin by presenting the use of parental leave by men and women in Figure 6.

As observed, parental leave is by far more popular among mothers than fathers: around 15% of the former make use of them, for only just 1% among the latter. The introduction of the policy does not seem to have clearly influenced these numbers, as differences between treatment and control groups are minor. However, at a descriptive level, the slight reduction observed on mothers might be related to the fact that families having children in the last months of 2021 might not have had enough time to take the parental leave, a problem that is handled by the estimation of the LATE using RDD.

FIGURE 6. PERCENTAGE OF MEN AND WOMEN MAKING USE OF PARENTAL LEAVE
AFTER THE CHILDBIRTH

Table 4 comprises the main results of the estimations run on the parental leave use for men and women. Again, complete tables can be found in Annex 4 (Table A4.6). We find very small and no significative effects of the policy on this outcome, neither for men nor women. Hence, the decrease in employment probability or cumulative working days for men has not been paired with an equivalent increase in the use of parental leave, but apparently with non-employment episodes. Consequently, the gender gap on parental leave use is unaltered, since mothers do still make use of it in a much more common manner than their partners.

| Specifications	(1) Simple	(2) (1) + covariates	(3) (2) + slope change	(4) (2) + non-lineal	(5) (2) + bw*2
Mothers					
Percentage of mothers who take parental leave	0.0416 (0.0301)	0.0388 (0.0294)	0.0273 (0.0336)	0.0356 (0.0314)	0.00528 (0.0202)
Fathers					
Percentage of fathers who take parental leave	0.00651 (0.00540)	0.00566 (0.00553)	0.00705 (0.00491)	0.00623 (0.00507)	0.00644 (0.00412)

We show a summary of the marginal effects of the policy introduction on the outcome variables. As covariates, we include all the aforementioned control variables, from sociodemographics to firm- and employee-related variables.

6. Discussion

As our study shows, the equalization of paternity and maternity leaves in Spain has not caused a major impact in the reduction of gender equality in the labor market. Regarding the effect on employment rates and work intensity of fathers and mothers, there has not been –for the moment– a substantial closing of the gender gap: women still present lower participation rates and (although smaller as a consequence of the reform) higher work intensity reduction after the reform, at least in the short-run. Although men's behavior might have been altered at the margin (with lower probability of being employed and with less cumulative working days one year after the childbirth), it is still early to determine whether the reform will suppose a major shift of preferences in a longer period of time.

Even with a modest impact into the labor market, the equalization policy is a fundamental stepping-stone for a more equal society in the near future. As proven, equal legal rights are not sufficient for the gender gap to close, but they are manifestly necessary. What this study concludes is that there are yet many other reasons for women to bear the responsibility of childcare, while not completely abandoning the labor market.

Until we get to reduce the effect of those social roles, we expect the impact of family-friendly policies to be limited. In that sense, many academic studies have already documented the necessity of encouraging fathers to take a higher portion of parental leave. Although the effects of mandatory leave periods on father-children attachment and a better partake of childcare responsibilities are well proved, it is still the case that non-mandatory parental leave mainly rests over women's shoulders. The case of Sweden, a pioneering country in implementing long full-pay parental leave is clear: men tend to be more reticent to staying at home, even with attractive incentives and a pro-equality social environment (Haas &

Hwang, 2008). Kluve & Tamm (2012) already proved that a generous parental leave regulation is not tantamount to a more equal gender distribution between careers and children. They find –in line with the results hereby provided– that mothers openly make use of long parental leave periods, which may interrupt their career and reduce their future projection. Among men, however, they found no significant evidence of a change of behavior, even with the introduction of a two-months long daddy quota, which would be lost if not made use of. Hence, roles are so entrenched that even more-generous-than-average policies fail to obtain the desired results.

Some sort of mandatory rules might for that matter be required in order to increase fathers' involvement and progressively erode social customs. Patnaik (2019) examines the Quebec Parental Insurance Program, which improved compensation and reserved 5 weeks of leave for fathers[18]. She found that fathers' participation increased by 250%, due to a combination of both higher benefits and the effect of labeling some weeks as 'daddy'-only. The first factor might have softened the financial impact of leaving a well-paid job for a period, while the second could be linked to a change in the socially acceptable messages. Additionally, the author provides evidence of the paternity leave extension reducing sex specialization in the long-run. Tamm (2018) finds evidence for Germany that supports this positive result. Thus, there may be enough policy tools to counteract settled social constrictions.

Nevertheless, the relation between earnings, career prospects and family responsibilities is yet to be fully disentangled considering the resistance of gender gaps. Regi & Solli (2013) investigate the effect of paternity leave on fathers' long-term earnings in Norway. They assume that if the paternity leave increases father involvement in family chores in the long-term, then we should expect their long-term earnings to be reduced, as they shift time and effort from market to home production. They conclude that –no matter how generous the paternity leave policy is– fathers' earnings are indeed affected, a persistent effect in time. However, it must be noted that, up to now, that interruption in the careers and the subsequent reduction in wage growth had almost exclusively affected women. Therefore, some concessions in terms of men's earnings are inevitable in order to fight for family-friendly and gender-neutral economic policies. With more men favoring wage growth and promotion at work, the mandatory nature of a parental leave policy is deemed indispensable.

Even with a negative impact on men's earnings, there is enough evidence to support the fact that fathers' staying at home –specially the first months of their children– more than

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[18] Many academic studies show that preferences regarding amenities related to jobs, wages and other compensations account for a significant part of gender differences in the labor market (Wiswall & Zafar, 2017; Maestas et al., 2018). In this sense, it might have been the case that partially financed or non-paying parental leave schemes might have dissuaded men from making use of them, in detriment to women, who favor other features, such as flexibility. For that matter, better funded programs of parental leave could be related to more effective results in convincing fathers to stay at home for longer periods.

offsets monetary losses in terms of household welfare. First, Tamm (2018) confirms that paternity leave significantly influences the time fathers dedicate to childcare, thus allowing mothers to better balance their time between the labor market and the family. Second, and again in line with the results obtained in the present study, fathers' temporal distancing from employment positively generates a prompter return of mothers to the labor market. Tamm (2018) also finds that even with parental leave schemes that allow for both parents to simultaneously stay at home, there is no decrease of labor supply of the couple. All in all, a policy allowing only consecutive spells of paid leave might have even larger positive effects on the division of housework and might further increase the overall supply of labor by couples. Similar arguments apply to a policy where paid leave of fathers requires that mothers return to work during that time. Last, Bünning (2015) shows that in Germany, fathers' who took parental leave permanently altered their preferences regarding work-home balance. However, this result only holds whenever fathers took more than two months of leave. Hence, data supports the fact that fathers increase their involvement in childcare already after short leaves, whereas an enhanced gender equality in couples' division of labor especially requires longer or solo leaves.

Notwithstanding leave policy's relevance in balancing the table at home, all evidence points to the fact that paternity and maternity leave extensions can't completely offset the impact of childbirth. In this sense, a reinforcement of other complementary policy is advisable in order to satisfactorily close the gap. For instance, the significant impact of early childcare provision (via 100% publicly funded schemes, as in France, or a mixed model of private services with some public financing) has been well-known for many years (Anderson & Levine, 1999). These childcare services might specifically address the need of non-paid parental leave after the basic paternity/maternity leave periods end, which particularly affect women. A recent study of the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission provides micro-simulations that show to what extent women would return to work after childbirth: in significant higher numbers and with longer working shifts (Narazani et al., 2023). Additionally, they show that this effect would be higher in those countries with lower female employment participation and more limited childcare provision, such as Spain.[19]

A second potentially beneficial complementary policy tool is the existence of a child allowance, which may cover the increment in childcare costs. Recently, the Basque Country has applied a universal child allowance for all children being born in the region, which

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[19] Eurostat data on childcare provision shows that in 2022, 51% of Spanish children below 3 years old had zero hours of childcare, 18% less than 24 weekly hours and just 31% more than 24 weekly hours. Although Spain is better off than the average of the EU27, it is still far from the numbers observed in the Netherlands, France or Sweden. From 3 years onward until the minimum compulsory schooling age more than 84% of Spanish children make use of childcare. However, this number lags behind the childcare use of other European countries. Therefore, there is plenty room for improvement in this area.

Online data code: ilc_caindform25

provides families with 200€ per month from the birth on until the child's third birthday, as well as an additional 100€ per month when there are more than three children in the household. Although this policy is particularly aimed at increasing fertility and covering some of the childbearing costs, its effect on women's employment participation has mixed results (Schirle, 2015; Asakawa & Sasaki, 2020).

In sum, we have concluded that some elements might be needed in order to ameliorate the impact of parental leave policies, such as a paid scheme or some mandatory requirements. The equalization of paternity and maternity leaves in Spain in addressed towards these objectives. Our results firstly suggest that some women still stay out of the labor market even when their partners take paternity leaves. In this sense, more constrictive rules regarding consecutive and simultaneous spells of parental leave may help counteract these tendences. Secondly, we find that even with relatively short periods of paid paternity and maternity leaves, women positively respond by increasing their working hours. Notwithstanding, the gender gap on part-time jobs and therefore on earnings is yet far from disappearing, although family-policies that redress imbalances of the board are progressing in a positive direction.

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Annex 1.

Window	±2 months	±3 months	±4 months	±5 months	±6 months
Monthly number of births	-15.5 (72.05)	-0.667 (90.1739)	-9.5 (74.164)	6.4 (60.443)	19.33 (50.612)
Log monthly number of births	-0.017 (0.0952)	-0.001 (0.1112)	-0.0106 (0.0911)	0.0073 (0.0742)	0.0221 (0.0621)
Lineal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N. obs.	4	6	8	10	12

Annex 2.

	Control		Treatment		Contrast	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Est	SE
(A) Age						
<30	0.16	(0.37)	0.16	(0.37)	0.00	(0.01)
30-35	0.44	(0.50)	0.44	(0.50)	0.00	(0.01)
36-40	0.30	(0.46)	0.30	(0.46)	0.00	(0.01)
>40	0.09	(0.29)	0.10	(0.30)	-0.00	(0.01)
(B) Nationality						
Native	0.91	(0.29)	0.89	(0.31)	-0.01*	(0.01)
Foreigner	0.09	(0.29)	0.11	(0.31)	-0.01*	(0.01)
(C) Type of contract						
Indef. FT	0.58	(0.49)	0.56	(0.50)	0.02	(0.01)
Indef. PT	0.24	(0.43)	0.24	(0.43)	0.00	(0.01)
Temp. FT	0.13	(0.33)	0.14	(0.35)	-0.01**	(0.01)
Temp. PT	0.06	(0.23)	0.06	(0.23)	-0.00	(0.00)
(D) Seniority						
<1 year	0.27	(0.44)	0.27	(0.44)	0.00	(0.01)
1-5 years	0.48	(0.50)	0.49	(0.50)	-0.02	(0.01)
>5 years	0.26	(0.44)	0.24	(0.43)	0.01	(0.01)
(E) Sector of activity						
Primary sector, utilities, mining	0.01	(0.09)	0.01	(0.10)	-0.00	(0.00)
Manufacturing	0.07	(0.26)	0.06	(0.25)	0.01*	(0.01)
Building sector	0.01	(0.11)	0.01	(0.11)	-0.00	(0.00)
Wholesale and retail sectors	0.21	(0.40)	0.19	(0.39)	0.01	(0.01)
Transport	0.02	(0.14)	0.02	(0.15)	-0.00	(0.00)
Hospitality	0.09	(0.29)	0.07	(0.26)	0.02***	(0.01)

Communications, finances, real-estate	0.07	(0.25)	0.07	(0.26)	-0.00	(0.01)
Professional, scientific and technic services	0.07	(0.26)	0.08	(0.27)	-0.01	(0.01)
Administration and auxiliary services, public sector	0.12	(0.32)	0.13	(0.34)	-0.01**	(0.01)
Education and health services	0.26	(0.44)	0.28	(0.45)	-0.02**	(0.01)
Other activities	0.08	(0.26)	0.07	(0.26)	0.00	(0.01)
(F) Size of the firm						
<10 employees	0.30	(0.46)	0.26	(0.44)	0.04***	(0.01)
10-50 employees	0.19	(0.39)	0.19	(0.39)	0.00	(0.01)
>50 employees	0.51	(0.50)	0.55	(0.50)	-0.04***	(0.01)
(G) Type of sector						
Private	0.86	(0.35)	0.83	(0.37)	0.03***	(0.01)
Public	0.14	(0.35)	0.17	(0.37)	-0.03***	(0.01)
(H) Autonomous Region						
Andalusia	0.16	(0.37)	0.16	(0.37)	-0.00	(0.01)
Aragon	0.03	(0.18)	0.03	(0.18)	-0.00	(0.00)
Asturias	0.01	(0.11)	0.01	(0.12)	-0.00	(0.00)
Balearic Islands	0.03	(0.17)	0.03	(0.18)	-0.00	(0.00)
Canary Islands	0.04	(0.20)	0.04	(0.19)	0.00	(0.00)
Cantabria	0.01	(0.11)	0.01	(0.10)	0.00	(0.00)
Castile and Leon	0.04	(0.20)	0.04	(0.18)	0.01	(0.00)
Castilla-La Mancha	0.04	(0.20)	0.05	(0.21)	-0.01	(0.00)
Catalonia	0.20	(0.40)	0.20	(0.40)	0.01	(0.01)
Valencian Community	0.09	(0.29)	0.10	(0.29)	-0.00	(0.01)
Extremadura	0.02	(0.14)	0.02	(0.14)	-0.00	(0.00)
Galicia	0.05	(0.22)	0.04	(0.21)	0.01*	(0.00)

	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Est	SE
Community of Madrid	0.20	(0.40)	0.21	(0.41)	-0.01*	(0.01)
Region of Murcia	0.03	(0.18)	0.03	(0.18)	-0.00	(0.00)
Navarre	0.01	(0.12)	0.02	(0.12)	-0.00	(0.00)
La Rioja	0.01	(0.09)	0.01	(0.08)	0.00	(0.00)
Ceuta and Melilla	0.00	(0.05)	0.00	(0.06)	-0.00	(0.00)
N	4,425		5,172		9,597	

TABLE A2.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, FATHERS

	Control		Treatment		Contrast	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Est	SE
(A) Age						
<30	0.13	(0.33)	0.12	(0.33)	0.00	(0.01)
30-35	0.34	(0.47)	0.36	(0.48)	-0.02**	(0.01)
36-40	0.31	(0.46)	0.31	(0.46)	0.01	(0.01)
>40	0.22	(0.42)	0.21	(0.41)	0.01	(0.01)
(B) Nationality						
Native	0.84	(0.37)	0.84	(0.37)	0.01	(0.01)
Foreigner	0.16	(0.37)	0.16	(0.37)	-0.01	(0.01)
(C) Type of contract						
Indef. FT	0.70	(0.46)	0.71	(0.45)	-0.01	(0.01)
Indef. PT	0.10	(0.30)	0.10	(0.30)	-0.00	(0.01)
Temp. FT	0.16	(0.37)	0.16	(0.36)	0.01	(0.01)
Temp. PT	0.04	(0.19)	0.03	(0.18)	0.00	(0.00)
(D) Seniority						
<1 year	0.33	(0.47)	0.32	(0.47)	0.01	(0.01)
1-5 years	0.40	(0.49)	0.41	(0.49)	-0.01	(0.01)
>5 years	0.28	(0.45)	0.27	(0.44)	0.01	(0.01)
(E) Sector of activity						
Primary sector, utilities, mining	0.03	(0.18)	0.03	(0.17)	0.00	(0.00)
Manufacturing	0.18	(0.38)	0.17	(0.38)	0.01	(0.01)
Building sector	0.12	(0.32)	0.11	(0.32)	0.01	(0.01)

Wholesale and retail sectors	0.17	(0.38)	0.18	(0.38)	-0.01	(0.01)
Transport	0.08	(0.27)	0.07	(0.26)	0.00	(0.00)
Hospitality	0.08	(0.27)	0.07	(0.25)	0.01*	(0.00)
Communications, finances, real-estate	0.08	(0.27)	0.08	(0.27)	-0.00	(0.01)
Professional, scientific and technic services	0.05	(0.22)	0.06	(0.23)	-0.00	(0.00)
Administration and auxiliary services, public sector	0.12	(0.32)	0.12	(0.33)	-0.00	(0.01)
Education and health services	0.07	(0.25)	0.08	(0.27)	-0.01**	(0.00)
Other activities	0.03	(0.16)	0.03	(0.17)	-0.00	(0.00)
(F) Size of the firm						
<10 employees	0.30	(0.46)	0.26	(0.44)	0.04***	(0.01)
10-50 employees	0.24	(0.43)	0.25	(0.43)	-0.01	(0.01)
>50 employees	0.46	(0.50)	0.49	(0.50)	-0.03***	(0.01)
(G) Type of sector						
Private	0.94	(0.24)	0.93	(0.25)	0.01**	(0.01)
Public	0.06	(0.24)	0.07	(0.25)	-0.01**	(0.01)
(H) Autonomous Region						
Andalusia	0.17	(0.38)	0.18	(0.38)	-0.00	(0.01)
Aragon	0.02	(0.15)	0.03	(0.18)	-0.01***	(0.00)
Asturias	0.02	(0.12)	0.02	(0.13)	-0.00	(0.00)
Balearic Islands	0.03	(0.17)	0.03	(0.17)	0.00	(0.00)
Canary Islands	0.04	(0.19)	0.04	(0.19)	0.00	(0.00)
Cantabria	0.01	(0.09)	0.01	(0.08)	0.00	(0.00)
Castile and Leon	0.04	(0.19)	0.04	(0.19)	-0.00	(0.00)
Castilla-La Mancha	0.05	(0.22)	0.04	(0.20)	0.01**	(0.00)
Catalonia	0.21	(0.41)	0.20	(0.40)	0.00	(0.01)

Valencian Community	0.10	(0.30)	0.11	(0.31)	-0.01	(0.01)
Extremadura	0.02	(0.15)	0.02	(0.13)	0.01**	(0.00)
Galicia	0.04	(0.21)	0.04	(0.20)	0.00	(0.00)
Community of Madrid	0.18	(0.39)	0.18	(0.38)	0.01	(0.01)
Region of Murcia	0.03	(0.18)	0.04	(0.20)	-0.01**	(0.00)
Navarre	0.02	(0.13)	0.02	(0.13)	-0.00	(0.00)
La Rioja	0.01	(0.07)	0.01	(0.08)	-0.00	(0.00)
Ceuta and Melilla	0.00	(0.06)	0.00	(0.06)	0.00	(0.00)
N	5,334		6,173		11,507	

Annex 3.

	Bw = 2	Bw = 3	Bw = 4	Bw = 5	Bw = 6
<30	-11	-5.33	-6.25	-4.2	-1.17
	(4.74)	(5.40)	(4.56)	(3.89)	(5.23)
30-35	-4.00	1.67	5.00	15.80	12.33
	(22.73)	(17.49)	(13.71)	(13.98)	(11.74)
36-40	9.50	13.00	8.75	6.60	4.83
	(10.69)	(16.38)	(13.11)	(10.48)	(8.91)
>40	-3.00	-5.67	-6.00	-2.60	-1.50
	(10.63)	(8.56)	(6.54)	(5.64)	(5.38)
Native	1.00	0.33	2.00	2.00	4.33
	(10.51)	(6.20)	(5.48)	(4.25)	(3.85)
Foreigner	-9.50	3.33	-0.50	13.60	10.17
	(36.70)	(39.96)	(31.06)	(27.29)	(23.08)
Indef. FT	-10.50	-3.67	-4.25	6.00	5.17
	(17.61)	(14.17)	(11.54)	(12.54)	(10.27)
Indef. PT	4.50	9.33	2.00	1.80	-2.17
	(10.11)	(7.20)	(7.35)	(6.32)	(5.93)
Temp. FT	6.50	1.00	3.75	5.60	5.33
	(18.03)	(18.08)	(15.31)	(11.93)	(9.94)
Temp. PT	-9.00	-3.00	0.00	2.20	6.17
	(7.62)	(10.46)	(7.72)	(6.22)	(6.14)
<1 year	3.00	0.33	-0.50	1.60	2.83
	(7.91)	(8.82)	(7.63)	(6.19)	(6.73)
1-5 years	-6.00	-2.67	-0.25	10.20	10.00
	(34.56)	(25.85)	(19.26)	(16.88)	(13.81)
>5 years	-5.50	6.00	2.25	3.80	1.67
	(8.14)	(13.90)	(11.56)	(10.11)	(8.57)

Primary sector, utilities, mining	2.00	3.00**	2.50**	1.60	1.17
	(1.00)	(0.94)	(0.76)	(1.00)	(0.90)
Manufacturing	0.50	1.33	-1.25	1.60	1.50
	(2.50)	(3.97)	(3.82)	(3.58)	(3.00)
Building sector	0.50	-0.67	0.25	-0.40	-1.00
	(4.03)	(2.49)	(1.89)	(1.54)	(1.41)
Wholesale and retail sectors	-13.50	-8.33	-11.75	-0.60	-5.17
	(9.55)	(8.78)	(7.01)	(9.70)	(8.56)
Transport	-3.50	-1.67	-2.00	0.00	0.83
	(5.41)	(3.48)	(2.61)	(2.55)	(2.23)
Hospitality	-7.50	-9.00	-11.00	-12.80*	-10.50*
	(13.09)	(9.16)	(6.80)	(5.43)	(5.04)
Communications, finances, real-estate	4.00	1.67	2.50	3.60	4.50
	(6.32)	(4.33)	(3.18)	(3.48)	(3.00)
Professional, scientific and technic services	1.50	-2.33	-3.00	2.00	3.67
	(9.96)	(6.36)	(5.89)	(5.91)	(4.98)
Administration and auxiliary services, public sector	5.50	6.00	5.75	7.60*	8.83**
	(4.03)	(4.35)	(3.99)	(3.44)	(2.94)
Education and health services	9.00	18.67	22.75	17.00	14.67
	(10.82)	(13.38)	(11.99)	(10.32)	(8.62)
Other activities	-7.00	-5.00	-3.25	-4.00	-4.00
	(5.66)	(4.85)	(4.08)	(4.16)	(3.59)
<10 employees	-12.00	-8.00	-16.00	-11.20	-12.33
	(8.00)	(11.70)	(13.52)	(11.38)	(9.76)

10-50 employees	1.00	-6.00	-1.50	-1.20	-3.17
	(14.16)	(9.97)	(7.76)	(6.02)	(6.07)
>50 employees	2.50	17.67	19.00	28.00	30.00*
	(25.30)	(27.46)	(20.76)	(18.11)	(14.88)
Public	9.50	15.00	17.50*	14.80**	14.33**
	(8.08)	(8.06)	(6.94)	(5.88)	(4.81)
Andalusia	9.00	9.33	9.25	7.80	5.50
	(12.75)	(7.50)	(5.31)	(4.24)	(3.83)
Aragon	1.50	-2.00	-2.50	-1.00	2.00
	(2.69)	(3.54)	(2.54)	(3.18)	(3.45)
Asturias	-2.00	-3.00	-2.75*	-0.80	-0.33
	(0.71)	(1.63)	(1.28)	(1.76)	(1.53)
Balearic Islands	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.20	1.50
	((2.24)	(3.54)	(3.21)	(3.02)	(2.76)
Canary Islands	-1.00	-4.00	-2.25	-2.00	-0.83
	(2.24)	(3.27)	(2.77)	(2.30)	(2.07)
Cantabria	-2.50	-0.67	-0.50	-1.40	-1.50
	(1.12)	(1.45)	(1.14)	(1.17)	(1.04)
Castile and Leon	-3.00	-3.67	-2.50	-2.20	-3.67
	(5.70)	(3.53)	(3.30)	(2.65)	(2.40)
Castilla-La Mancha	3.50	5.67*	2.25	3.80	3.00
	(3.20)	(2.43)	(3.09)	(2.65)	(2.38)
Catalonia	-5.00	2.00	-2.00	2.00	2.83
	(13.60)	(13.40)	(10.17)	(8.41)	(7.09)
Valencian Community	0.00	2.67	0.00	1.40	2.67
	(1.00)	(11.02)	(8.43)	(6.70)	(5.63)
Extremadura	-2.00	-1.00	-0.50	0.00	-0.33
	(1.41)	(1.97)	(2.19)	(1.82)	(1.86)

	Bw = 2	Bw = 3	Bw = 4	Bw = 5	Bw = 6
Galicia	-3.50	-4.00*	-2.75	-1.80	-3.67
	(2.69)	(1.80)	(2.06)	(3.17)	(3.13)
Community of Madrid	-7.00	-5.33	-2.50	4.00	6.17
	(16.03)	(9.82)	(8.44)	(8.25)	(6.92)
Region of Murcia	0.00	2.33	1.75	0.40	0.17
	(2.83)	(2.33)	(1.87)	(1.75)	(1.54)
Navarre	0.00	1.00	1.75	0.00	-0.83
	(3.16)	(2.08)	(1.99)	(1.99)	(1.74)
La Rioja	1.00	1.33	0.75	1.00	0.50
	(1.58)	(0.94)	(0.80)	(0.65)	(0.64)
Ceuta and Melilla	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.20**	1.33**
	(0.50)	(0.58)	(0.54)	(0.45)	(0.42)
N	4	6	8	10	12

TABLE A3.2: REGRESSION POINT ESTIMATES OF CONTROL VARIABLES, FATHERS

	Bw = 2	Bw = 3	Bw = 4	Bw = 5	Bw = 6
<30	-12.50	-10.67	-12.50	-8.80	-7.50
	(15.95)	(12.51)	(9.41)	(8.27)	(6.82)
30-35	-6.00	4.33	1.50	2.60	6.67
	(19.03)	(19.51)	(16.96)	(13.16)	(11.18)
36-40	17.00**	13.67	11.25	5.40	10.67
	(3.16)	(17.23)	(12.66)	(10.75)	(9.62)
>40	-5.50	-11.67	-11.25	-8.40	-5.00
	(12.26)	(10.12)	(9.39)	(7.91)	(7.00)
Native	-14.00**	-18.00*	-22.25**	-20.00***	-14.33***
	(3.16)	(7.41)	(6.05)	(5.29)	(6.17)
Foreigner	7.00	13.67	11.25	10.80	19.17
	(26.50)	(42.06)	(36.67)	(28.81)	(24.26)
Indef. FT	6.00	-2.00	-8.25	-2.60	7.33
	(28.54)	(26.91)	(22.31)	(17.90)	(16.32)

Indef. PT	-3.00	2.00	-1.25	-0.80	0.83
	(1.00)	(6.50)	(5.58)	(4.36)	(3.76)
Temp. FT	-3.00	4.00	4.50	-1.80	0.00
	(4.30)	(19.20)	(16.20)	(13.37)	(12.20)
Temp. PT	-7.00	-8.33	-6.00	-4.00	-3.33
	(6.67)	(4.14)	(3.36)	(3.95)	(3.72)
<1 year	-12.00***	-8.00	-12.75	-14.00	-8.67
	(0.71)	(14.66)	(12.42)	(9.74)	(9.77)
1-5 years	1.00	2.67	-0.25	0.40	7.50
	(15.26)	(19.79)	(15.17)	(13.96)	(12.62)
>5 years	4.00	1.00	2.00	4.40	6.00
	(14.87)	(16.08)	(15.33)	(12.00)	(9.91)
Primary sector. utilities. mining	7.50	5.67	-0.25	0.00	-0.17
	(3.20)	(2.40)	(4.65)	(3.77)	(3.12)
Manufacturing	-12.00	-3.33	-1.50	2.60	4.33
	(11.34)	(11.27)	(8.24)	(7.10)	(6.01)
Building sector	-2.50	-4.33	-3.75	-6.00	-2.67
	(6.50)	(10.56)	(7.60)	(6.10)	(5.74)
Wholesale and retail sectors	-6.50	5.00	6.50	3.20	5.67
	(7.16)	(10.32)	(11.88)	(9.49)	(7.95)
Transport	0.50	-3.00	-6.00	-4.20	-2.33
	(6.10)	(6.65)	(6.19)	(5.31)	(4.61)
Hospitality	-8.00	-10.33	-13.25**	-11.20**	-10.33**
	(3.81)	(6.72)	(5.38)	(4.60)	(3.82)
Communications. finances. real-estate	20.00**	9.00	4.25	3.40	2.33
	(3.61)	(9.98)	(7.81)	(6.24)	(5.16)
Professional. scientific and technic services	8.00	5.67	4.50	3.40	4.33
	(8.63)	(6.20)	(4.47)	(3.62)	(3.11)

Administration and auxiliary services. public sector	-11.00	-7.00	-6.00	-5.00	-2.50
	(6.71)	(5.82)	(4.37)	(3.71)	(3.62)
Education and health services	0.00	1.67	5.25	4.80	5.33
	(7.21)	(6.57)	(5.32)	(4.26)	(3.50)
Other activities	-3.00	-3.33	-0.75	-0.20	0.83
	(3.61)	(2.40)	(3.09)	(2.46)	(2.18)
<10 employees	-11.00*	-9.00	-11.50	-17.40	-17.17
	(2.83)	(13.37)	(14.76)	(12.32)	(10.06)
10-50 employees	-8.00	-5.00	-4.50	-2.00	4.00
	(6.08)	(8.38)	(7.80)	(6.44)	(6.76)
>50 employees	12.00	9.67	5.00	10.20	18.00
	(19.66)	(27.49)	(20.45)	(17.36)	(15.28)
Public	4.00	8.00	9.00*	6.20	5.83*
	(3.16)	(5.79)	(4.16)	(3.88)	(3.22)
Andalusia	3.00	4.67	5.50	5.20	4.00
	(5.15)	(9.07)	(8.12)	(6.64)	(5.57)
Aragon	4.50	5.00	4.50	4.80**	5.17***
	(3.91)	(2.36)	(1.77)	(1.56)	(1.54)
Asturias	-0.50	-2.00	-2.25*	-2.20*	-0.83
	(1.50)	(1.41)	(1.15)	(1.00)	(1.33)
Balearic Islands	-1.00	-3.00	-3.50	-4.20	-3.00
	(0.71)	(3.40)	(3.08)	(2.81)	(2.46)
Canary Islands	1.00	2.33	0.25	0.00	-1.00
	(4.74)	(4.94)	(4.07)	(3.24)	(2.81)
Cantabria	-0.50	0.33	0.25	0.60	-0.17
	(1.50)	(1.05)	(0.75)	(1.52)	(1.63)
Castile and Leon	-1.00	-3.67	0.00	0.80	1.00
	(3.16)	(3.23)	(3.99)	(4.00)	(3.66)

Castilla-La Mancha	-0.50	-2.67	-6.25	-6.60*	-4.50
	(4.61)	(3.33)	(4.03)	(3.34)	(3.13)
Catalonia	-15.00*	-3.00	-6.25	-5.00	1.00
	(4.12)	(11.91)	(8.76)	(8.15)	(7.98)
Valencian Community	8.50	3.00	2.75	1.20	2.67
	(9.96)	(7.23)	(5.66)	(4.52)	(3.84)
Extremadura	-1.00	-0.33	-1.50	-1.80	-1.50
	(1.58)	(1.56)	(1.50)	(1.28)	(1.09)
Galicia	-5.50	-3.67	-1.00	1.00	0.00
	(3.20)	(4.50)	(3.76)	(3.24)	(2.74)
Community of Madrid	-5.00	-4.33	-4.50	-3.00	0.00
	(10.51)	(11.42)	(9.41)	(8.14)	(7.16)
Region of Murcia	1.00	-0.67	-2.00	-1.80	-0.83
	(3.61)	(2.67)	(2.19)	(2.00)	(1.87)
Navarre	3.50	3.00	2.00	2.40	2.50*
	(1.80)	(1.89)	(1.78)	(1.41)	(1.19)
La Rioja	0.00	-0.33	0.00	-0.80	0.17
	(1.41)	(1.45)	(1.06)	(1.02)	(1.11)
Ceuta and Melilla	1.50	1.00	1.00	0.20	0.17
	(1.12)	(0.82)	(0.68)	(0.80)	(0.79)
N	4	6	8	10	12

Annex 4.

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Running variable	0.0156***	0.0142***	0.0107	0.0181	-0.00154	0.0122**	0.0103**	0.0202**	0.0121**	-0.000753
	(0.00538)	(0.00529)	(0.00953)	(0.0214)	(0.00202)	(0.00483)	(0.00470)	(0.00835)	(0.00489)	(0.00181)
Treat	-0.0464	-0.0466	-0.0412	-0.0509	0.0166	-0.0432*	-0.0433*	-0.0588**	-0.0546**	0.00768
	(0.0295)	(0.0290)	(0.0315)	(0.0444)	(0.0204)	(0.0259)	(0.0252)	(0.0270)	(0.0261)	(0.0179)
Interac			0.00521					-0.0148		
			(0.0115)					(0.0102)		
30-35		-0.0172	-0.0173	-0.0172	-0.00337		0.0363*	0.0366*	0.0365*	0.0144
		(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0148)		(0.0194)	(0.0194)	(0.0194)	(0.0142)
35-40		-0.0348	-0.0350	-0.0349	-0.0128		0.00493	0.00540	0.00528	0.00514
		(0.0224)	(0.0224)	(0.0224)	(0.0160)		(0.0211)	(0.0211)	(0.0211)	(0.0152)
>40		0.0370	0.0365	0.0367	0.0329*		0.0301	0.0316	0.0314	0.0179
		(0.0275)	(0.0276)	(0.0276)	(0.0197)		(0.0270)	(0.0270)	(0.0270)	(0.0193)
Native		0.0239	0.0239	0.0239	0.0268		0.0675***	0.0677***	0.0678***	0.0698***
		(0.0250)	(0.0250)	(0.0251)	(0.0176)		(0.0251)	(0.0251)	(0.0251)	(0.0178)
Indef. PT		0.00340	0.00343	0.00346	-0.00556		0.0152	0.0151	0.0152	-0.00336
		(0.0188)	(0.0188)	(0.0188)	(0.0135)		(0.0161)	(0.0161)	(0.0161)	(0.0123)
Temp. FT		-0.061***	-0.061***	-0.061***	-0.031**		-0.053***	-0.052***	-0.053***	-0.03***
		(0.0187)	(0.0187)	(0.0187)	(0.0132)		(0.0166)	(0.0166)	(0.0166)	(0.0122)
Temp. PT		-0.089***	-0.089***	-0.089***	-0.068***		-0.081***	-0.081***	-0.081***	-0.073***
		(0.0233)	(0.0233)	(0.0233)	(0.0165)		(0.0217)	(0.0217)	(0.0217)	(0.0158)
Public sector		0.0924***	0.0922***	0.0922***	0.0590***		0.0642***	0.0646***	0.0646***	0.0417**
		(0.0255)	(0.0255)	(0.0255)	(0.0186)		(0.0216)	(0.0216)	(0.0216)	(0.0167)
1-4 emp.		0.0937***	0.0937***	0.0937***	0.0968***		0.0643**	0.0644**	0.0643*	0.0663***
		(0.0320)	(0.0320)	(0.0320)	(0.0228)		(0.0328)	(0.0328)	(0.0328)	(0.0232)
5-9 emp.		0.0709**	0.0707**	0.0706**	0.0612**		0.120***	0.121***	0.121***	0.106***
		(0.0356)	(0.0356)	(0.0356)	(0.0257)		(0.0339)	(0.0339)	(0.0339)	(0.0244)
10-24 emp.		0.0810**	0.0814**	0.0813**	0.0897***		0.113***	0.111***	0.111***	0.112***
		(0.0325)	(0.0325)	(0.0325)	(0.0231)		(0.0320)	(0.0320)	(0.0320)	(0.0226)
25-49 emp.		0.0516	0.0519	0.0519	0.0721***		0.121***	0.120***	0.120***	0.100***
		(0.0348)	(0.0348)	(0.0349)	(0.0242)		(0.0328)	(0.0328)	(0.0328)	(0.0234)
50-99 emp.		0.0803**	0.0802**	0.0803**	0.0695***		0.144***	0.145***	0.145***	0.126***
		(0.0335)	(0.0335)	(0.0335)	(0.0245)		(0.0316)	(0.0315)	(0.0315)	(0.0230)
100-249 emp.		0.0590*	0.0590*	0.0589*	0.0639***		0.160***	0.160***	0.160***	0.127***
		(0.0319)	(0.0319)	(0.0319)	(0.0230)		(0.0297)	(0.0297)	(0.0297)	(0.0217)
250-499 emp.		0.0574	0.0576*	0.0575	0.0664***		0.114***	0.114***	0.114***	0.103***

	(0.0350)	(0.0349)	(0.0350)	(0.0245)	(0.0331)	(0.0331)	(0.0331)	(0.0236)
500-1499 emp.	0.0804**	0.0807**	0.0806**	0.0825***	0.138***	0.137***	0.137***	0.119***
	(0.0329)	(0.0330)	(0.0330)	(0.0236)	(0.0312)	(0.0312)	(0.0312)	(0.0225)
>1499 emp.	0.0399	0.0404	0.0403	0.0512**	0.130***	0.128***	0.128***	0.112***
	(0.0326)	(0.0326)	(0.0327)	(0.0237)	(0.0303)	(0.0304)	(0.0304)	(0.0222)
1-5 years seniority	0.0809***	0.0809***	0.0809***	0.105***	0.0623***	0.0624***	0.0622***	0.0668***
	(0.0180)	(0.0180)	(0.0180)	(0.0130)	(0.0163)	(0.0163)	(0.0163)	(0.0119)
>5 years seniority	0.128***	0.128***	0.128***	0.159***	0.0956***	0.0957***	0.0956***	0.111***
	(0.0202)	(0.0202)	(0.0202)	(0.0144)	(0.0183)	(0.0183)	(0.0183)	(0.0132)
Wholesale, retail, transport, hospitality	-0.0592**	-0.0593**	-0.0592**	-0.0446**	-0.0266	-0.0264	-0.0264	-0.00755
	(0.0257)	(0.0257)	(0.0257)	(0.0185)	(0.0234)	(0.0234)	(0.0234)	(0.0175)
Other services	-0.0165	-0.0166	-0.0165	-0.00508	0.00916	0.00933	0.00932	0.0281*
	(0.0246)	(0.0246)	(0.0246)	(0.0176)	(0.0221)	(0.0221)	(0.0221)	(0.0164)
Aragon	-0.105**	-0.105**	-0.105**	-0.0462	-0.0560	-0.0543	-0.0539	-0.0202
	(0.0445)	(0.0445)	(0.0446)	(0.0298)	(0.0394)	(0.0393)	(0.0394)	(0.0277)
Asturias	0.00629	0.00531	0.00579	-0.0242	0.0956***	0.0983***	0.0988***	0.0608*
	(0.0562)	(0.0562)	(0.0563)	(0.0427)	(0.0338)	(0.0337)	(0.0337)	(0.0341)
Balearic Islands	-0.0622	-0.0622	-0.0621	-0.120***	-0.0144	-0.0145	-0.0146	0.0294
	(0.0426)	(0.0426)	(0.0426)	(0.0318)	(0.0385)	(0.0385)	(0.0385)	(0.0271)
Canary Islands	0.0292	0.0290	0.0291	0.0495**	0.00522	0.00601	0.00618	0.00804
	(0.0348)	(0.0348)	(0.0348)	(0.0246)	(0.0325)	(0.0325)	(0.0325)	(0.0249)
Cantabria	-0.0109	-0.0102	-0.0106	0.0298	-0.0423	-0.0445	-0.0450	-0.0184
	(0.0841)	(0.0838)	(0.0839)	(0.0502)	(0.0806)	(0.0813)	(0.0812)	(0.0530)
Castile and León	-0.0233	-0.0236	-0.0237	-0.0535*	-0.00289	-0.00196	-0.00191	0.0152
	(0.0396)	(0.0396)	(0.0396)	(0.0301)	(0.0354)	(0.0355)	(0.0355)	(0.0261)
Castilla-La Mancha	-0.079**	-0.079**	-0.079**	-0.074***	-0.10***	-0.100***	-0.099***	-0.059**
	(0.0375)	(0.0375)	(0.0375)	(0.0277)	(0.0363)	(0.0363)	(0.0363)	(0.0266)
Catalonia	-0.0162	-0.0165	-0.0165	-0.000222	0.00574	0.00645	0.00645	0.0283*
	(0.0224)	(0.0224)	(0.0224)	(0.0159)	(0.0199)	(0.0199)	(0.0199)	(0.0149)
Valencia	-0.093***	-0.094***	-0.094***	-0.063***	-0.0393	-0.0380	-0.0380	-0.0157
	(0.0293)	(0.0293)	(0.0293)	(0.0213)	(0.0257)	(0.0256)	(0.0256)	(0.0194)
Extremadura	-0.0285	-0.0287	-0.0287	-0.0698*	-0.0588	-0.0580	-0.0575	-0.0547
	(0.0516)	(0.0516)	(0.0517)	(0.0378)	(0.0485)	(0.0487)	(0.0488)	(0.0359)
Galicia	0.0423	0.0421	0.0423	0.0544**	0.0342	0.0346	0.0351	0.0307
	(0.0317)	(0.0317)	(0.0318)	(0.0215)	(0.0290)	(0.0289)	(0.0289)	(0.0221)
Madrid	0.0195	0.0192	0.0194	0.0357**	0.0265	0.0272	0.0274	0.0535***
	(0.0213)	(0.0214)	(0.0214)	(0.0153)	(0.0192)	(0.0192)	(0.0192)	(0.0143)
Murcia	-0.0679	-0.0678	-0.0679	-0.0434	-0.0956**	-0.0960**	-0.0959**	-0.0567*
	(0.0477)	(0.0477)	(0.0477)	(0.0321)	(0.0458)	(0.0457)	(0.0457)	(0.0317)
Navarre	-0.0358	-0.0361	-0.0363	-0.126***	-0.0322	-0.0314	-0.0320	-0.0569

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	(0.0591)	(0.0591)	(0.0592)	(0.0457)		(0.0554)	(0.0554)	(0.0553)	(0.0416)	
La Rioja	0.127***	0.127***	0.127***	0.0476		0.0196	0.0199	0.0206	0.0309	
	(0.0377)	(0.0378)	(0.0378)	(0.0493)		(0.0559)	(0.0553)	(0.0554)	(0.0479)	
Ceuta and Melilla	-0.110	-0.109	-0.109	-0.0631		-0.138	-0.140	-0.140	-0.0878	
	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.0963)		(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.0952)	
Running variable squared				0.00126					-0.00168	
				(0.00449)					(0.00107)	
Interaction squared				-0.00191						
				(0.00913)						
Constant	0.824***	0.745***	0.736***	0.745***	0.646***	0.872***	0.644***	0.669***	0.662***	0.588***
	(0.0174)	(0.0486)	(0.0525)	(0.0543)	(0.0347)	(0.0152)	(0.0474)	(0.0501)	(0.0486)	(0.0343)
Observations	3,443	3,443	3,443	3,443	6,741	3,429	3,429	3,429	3,429	6,705
R-squared	0.004	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.051	0.002	0.067	0.067	0.067	0.049

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A4.2: ESTIMATION RESULTS OF REGRESSIONS ON THE EMPLOYMENT RATE AT THE SIXTH MONTH (REGRESSIONS 1-5) AND THE TWELFTH MONTH (REGRESSIONS 6-10), FATHERS

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Running variable	0.00853*	0.0091**	0.0177*	0.0110**	0.00189	0.00279	0.00329	0.00576	0.00362	0.00177
	(0.00482)	(0.00462)	(0.00920)	(0.00497)	(0.00179)	(0.00325)	(0.00313)	(0.00511)	(0.00316)	(0.00120)
Treat	-0.0236	-0.0317*	-0.0443**	-0.0411**	-0.00442	-0.0217	-0.0305*	-0.0343**	-0.0327*	-0.0215*
	(0.0200)	(0.0192)	(0.0225)	(0.0208)	(0.0136)	(0.0174)	(0.0167)	(0.0174)	(0.0169)	(0.0118)
Interac			-0.0121					-0.00373		
			(0.0106)					(0.00645)		
30-35		0.072***	0.072***	0.072***	0.045***		0.0260	0.0258	0.0258	0.0280**
		(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0139)		(0.0167)	(0.0167)	(0.0167)	(0.0118)
35-40		0.056***	0.056***	0.056***	0.0345**		0.043***	0.043***	0.043***	0.035***
		(0.0210)	(0.0209)	(0.0209)	(0.0142)		(0.0165)	(0.0165)	(0.0165)	(0.0118)
>40		0.0525**	0.0519**	0.0519**	0.0268*		0.0171	0.0169	0.0169	0.00973
		(0.0220)	(0.0219)	(0.0219)	(0.0150)		(0.0181)	(0.0181)	(0.0181)	(0.0129)
Native		-8.79e-05	5.21e-05	0.000134	0.0241**		0.0234	0.0234	0.0234	0.028***
		(0.0156)	(0.0156)	(0.0156)	(0.0115)		(0.0145)	(0.0145)	(0.0145)	(0.0101)
Indef. PT		0.00931	0.00899	0.00890	0.00978		-0.00717	-0.00719	-0.00718	-0.00746
		(0.0119)	(0.0119)	(0.0119)	(0.00909)		(0.0127)	(0.0128)	(0.0128)	(0.00957)
Temp. FT		-0.059***	-0.059***	-0.059***	-0.057***		-0.055***	-0.056***	-0.056***	-0.055***
		(0.0104)	(0.0104)	(0.0104)	(0.00767)		(0.00929)	(0.00929)	(0.00929)	(0.00675)

Temp. PT	-0.107***	-0.107***	-0.107***	-0.088***	-0.099***	-0.099***	-0.099***	-0.082***
	(0.0256)	(0.0256)	(0.0256)	(0.0181)	(0.0215)	(0.0215)	(0.0215)	(0.0152)
Public sector	0.057***	0.057***	0.056***	0.05***	0.0340**	0.0338*	0.0338*	0.0315**
	(0.0201)	(0.0201)	(0.0201)	(0.0144)	(0.0173)	(0.0173)	(0.0173)	(0.0133)
1-4 emp.	0.069***	0.06***	0.068***	0.0484**	0.0271	0.0270	0.0271	0.065***
	(0.0263)	(0.0263)	(0.0263)	(0.0196)	(0.0249)	(0.0249)	(0.0249)	(0.0179)
5-9 emp.	0.0490*	0.0488*	0.0488*	0.0464**	0.079***	0.079***	0.079***	0.081***
	(0.0269)	(0.0269)	(0.0269)	(0.0195)	(0.0230)	(0.0230)	(0.0230)	(0.0175)
10-24 emp.	0.074***	0.073***	0.073***	0.073***	0.074***	0.074***	0.074***	0.086***
	(0.0238)	(0.0238)	(0.0238)	(0.0175)	(0.0216)	(0.0216)	(0.0216)	(0.0163)
25-49 emp.	0.0608**	0.0602**	0.0603**	0.061***	0.077***	0.077***	0.077***	0.087***
	(0.0249)	(0.0249)	(0.0249)	(0.0180)	(0.0220)	(0.0220)	(0.0220)	(0.0165)
50-99 emp.	0.0284	0.0276	0.0276	0.0427**	0.071***	0.07***	0.071***	0.086***
	(0.0280)	(0.0280)	(0.0280)	(0.0192)	(0.0231)	(0.0231)	(0.0231)	(0.0170)
100-249 emp.	0.0581**	0.0580**	0.0580**	0.0457**	0.076***	0.076***	0.07***	0.086***
	(0.0246)	(0.0246)	(0.0246)	(0.0181)	(0.0218)	(0.0218)	(0.0218)	(0.0164)
250-499 emp.	0.0463*	0.0456*	0.0456*	0.0477**	0.071***	0.071***	0.071***	0.085***
	(0.0266)	(0.0266)	(0.0266)	(0.0189)	(0.0230)	(0.0230)	(0.0230)	(0.0172)
500-1499 emp.	0.0349	0.0354	0.0352	0.0334*	0.063***	0.063***	0.063***	0.083***
	(0.0272)	(0.0272)	(0.0272)	(0.0199)	(0.0236)	(0.0236)	(0.0236)	(0.0174)
>1499 emp.	0.0291	0.0293	0.0294	0.0340*	0.075***	0.076***	0.076***	0.090***
	(0.0264)	(0.0264)	(0.0264)	(0.0187)	(0.0218)	(0.0218)	(0.0218)	(0.0166)
1-5 years seniority	0.122***	0.123***	0.123***	0.128***	0.090***	0.090***	0.090***	0.081***
	(0.0131)	(0.0131)	(0.0131)	(0.00951)	(0.0110)	(0.0110)	(0.0110)	(0.00794)
>5 years seniority	0.136***	0.136***	0.136***	0.146***	0.097***	0.097***	0.097***	0.096***
	(0.0132)	(0.0132)	(0.0132)	(0.00935)	(0.0109)	(0.0109)	(0.0109)	(0.00765)
Wholesale, retail, transport, hospitality	-0.00680	-0.00686	-0.00676	-0.0139	0.0108	0.0108	0.0108	-0.000673
	(0.0118)	(0.0118)	(0.0118)	(0.00883)	(0.0105)	(0.0105)	(0.0105)	(0.00769)
Other services	0.000289	0.000155	0.000202	0.00436	0.0111	0.0111	0.0111	0.00180
	(0.0117)	(0.0117)	(0.0117)	(0.00858)	(0.0105)	(0.0105)	(0.0105)	(0.00767)
Aragon	0.0256	0.0252	0.0253	0.0284	0.00720	0.00705	0.00709	0.0288*
	(0.0233)	(0.0233)	(0.0233)	(0.0180)	(0.0260)	(0.0260)	(0.0260)	(0.0169)
Asturias	-0.0160	-0.0167	-0.0166	0.0104	0.0276	0.0275	0.0275	0.0317
	(0.0424)	(0.0424)	(0.0424)	(0.0264)	(0.0317)	(0.0317)	(0.0317)	(0.0210)
Balearic Islands	-0.0241	-0.0234	-0.0232	-0.0638**	0.0371	0.0374	0.0374	0.0411**
	(0.0364)	(0.0361)	(0.0360)	(0.0273)	(0.0250)	(0.0250)	(0.0251)	(0.0178)
Canary Islands	-0.0192	-0.0192	-0.0192	0.00978	-0.00219	-0.00203	-0.00205	-0.0316
	(0.0328)	(0.0328)	(0.0328)	(0.0206)	(0.0274)	(0.0274)	(0.0274)	(0.0214)

Cantabria		0.0687**	0.0672**	0.0669**	0.071***		-0.0189	-0.0186	-0.0185	0.0342
		(0.0274)	(0.0273)	(0.0272)	(0.0235)		(0.0637)	(0.0636)	(0.0636)	(0.0303)
Castile and León		-4.55e-05	0.000591	0.000781	0.00516		0.00815	0.00825	0.00824	0.00474
		(0.0245)	(0.0246)	(0.0246)	(0.0187)		(0.0222)	(0.0223)	(0.0223)	(0.0165)
Castilla-La Mancha		0.0126	0.0124	0.0125	0.0124		0.0321	0.0321	0.0321	0.0148
		(0.0255)	(0.0256)	(0.0256)	(0.0185)		(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0204)	(0.0161)
Catalonia		0.0186	0.0180	0.0179	0.0262**		0.00612	0.00584	0.00587	0.0156
		(0.0157)	(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0116)		(0.0144)	(0.0144)	(0.0144)	(0.0102)
Valencia		0.00649	0.00647	0.00655	0.0148		0.0298*	0.0297*	0.0297*	0.0258**
		(0.0192)	(0.0192)	(0.0192)	(0.0139)		(0.0157)	(0.0157)	(0.0157)	(0.0115)
Extremadura		-0.0367	-0.0371	-0.0371	-0.0157		-0.00593	-0.00604	-0.00603	-0.00161
		(0.0413)	(0.0413)	(0.0412)	(0.0292)		(0.0329)	(0.0328)	(0.0328)	(0.0242)
Galicia		0.0269	0.0270	0.0270	0.00709		0.0385**	0.0384**	0.0384**	0.037***
		(0.0226)	(0.0226)	(0.0226)	(0.0178)		(0.0188)	(0.0188)	(0.0188)	(0.0140)
Madrid		0.0275*	0.0275*	0.0275*	0.032***		0.0304**	0.0304**	0.0304**	0.029***
		(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0114)		(0.0132)	(0.0132)	(0.0132)	(0.00960)
Murcia		0.0175	0.0177	0.0176	-0.000229		0.00331	0.00336	0.00336	0.0169
		(0.0258)	(0.0258)	(0.0258)	(0.0202)		(0.0245)	(0.0245)	(0.0245)	(0.0170)
Navarre		0.0205	0.0211	0.0213	-0.0173		0.0182	0.0185	0.0185	0.00391
		(0.0348)	(0.0346)	(0.0345)	(0.0304)		(0.0309)	(0.0308)	(0.0308)	(0.0259)
La Rioja		0.099***	0.098***	0.098***	0.0554*		0.0435	0.0429	0.0430	-0.00515
		(0.0260)	(0.0255)	(0.0256)	(0.0293)		(0.0499)	(0.0498)	(0.0499)	(0.0413)
Ceuta and Melilla		-0.0429	-0.0413	-0.0414	0.00764		-0.00468	-0.00415	-0.00430	0.0420
		(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.0560)		(0.0819)	(0.0818)	(0.0819)	(0.0434)
Running variable squared				-0.00187					-0.000347	
				(0.00144)					(0.00068)	
Constant	0.940***	0.768***	0.787***	0.782***	0.743***	0.940***	0.773***	0.779***	0.776***	0.760***
	(0.0120)	(0.0362)	(0.0399)	(0.0379)	(0.0257)	(0.0102)	(0.0313)	(0.0332)	(0.0320)	(0.0225)
Observations	3,042	3,042	3,042	3,042	5,940	3,988	3,988	3,988	3,988	7,832
R-squared	0.001	0.119	0.119	0.119	0.113	0.000	0.088	0.088	0.088	0.075

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Running variable	0.0142**	0.0147**	0.0351**	0.0183**	0.00559**	0.0207**	0.0205**	0.0363	0.0247**	0.00389
	(0.00668)	(0.00673)	(0.0152)	(0.00757)	(0.00269)	(0.00928)	(0.00940)	(0.0230)	(0.0110)	(0.00366)
Treat	-0.0406**	-0.0408**	-0.0672**	-0.0529**	-0.0226	-0.0693**	-0.0665**	-0.0869**	-0.0806**	-0.0258
	(0.0203)	(0.0206)	(0.0292)	(0.0253)	(0.0142)	(0.0282)	(0.0283)	(0.0410)	(0.0350)	(0.0202)
Interac			-0.0251					-0.0194		
			(0.0168)					(0.0253)		
30-35		-0.00575	-0.00542	-0.00559	-0.00677		0.00172	0.00197	0.00190	-0.00531
		(0.0154)	(0.0154)	(0.0154)	(0.0112)		(0.0213)	(0.0213)	(0.0214)	(0.0153)
35-40		-0.0223	-0.0219	-0.0220	-0.0186*		-0.0203	-0.0199	-0.0199	-0.0240
		(0.0148)	(0.0148)	(0.0148)	(0.0111)		(0.0225)	(0.0225)	(0.0225)	(0.0161)
>40		-0.00227	-0.000966	-0.00161	-0.00121		-0.0314	-0.0304	-0.0306	-0.0243
		(0.0220)	(0.0221)	(0.0220)	(0.0159)		(0.0289)	(0.0289)	(0.0289)	(0.0204)
Native		0.0271**	0.0266**	0.0268**	0.0135		0.0309	0.0306	0.0306	0.0249
		(0.0120)	(0.0120)	(0.0120)	(0.0106)		(0.0208)	(0.0208)	(0.0208)	(0.0152)
Indef. PT		0.0351**	0.03***	0.035***	0.028***		0.039*	0.039*	0.0392*	0.0286**
		(0.0137)	(0.0137)	(0.0137)	(0.0101)		(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0145)
Temp. FT		0.0215*	0.0222*	0.0220*	0.0126*		0.0198	0.0204	0.0204	0.0222*
		(0.0114)	(0.0115)	(0.0115)	(0.00762)		(0.0193)	(0.0193)	(0.0193)	(0.0127)
Temp. PT		0.054***	0.054***	0.054***	0.047***		0.0258	0.0263	0.0266	0.0215
		(0.0175)	(0.0175)	(0.0176)	(0.0130)		(0.0220)	(0.0220)	(0.0221)	(0.0156)
Public sector		0.0122	0.0117	0.0118	-0.00144		-0.0238	-0.0241	-0.0242	-0.0177
		(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0132)		(0.0249)	(0.0249)	(0.0249)	(0.0181)
1-4 emp.		-0.0340	-0.0335	-0.0338	-0.0247		-0.089***	-0.089***	-0.089***	-0.074***
		(0.0239)	(0.0238)	(0.0239)	(0.0162)		(0.0334)	(0.0334)	(0.0334)	(0.0229)
5-9 emp.		-0.0300	-0.0304	-0.0305	0.000321		-0.0736*	-0.0739*	-0.0743*	-0.0195
		(0.0275)	(0.0273)	(0.0274)	(0.0196)		(0.0381)	(0.0381)	(0.0380)	(0.0277)
10-24 emp.		-0.00970	-0.00986	-0.0101	-0.0203		-0.0799**	-0.0800**	-0.0803**	-0.083***
		(0.0262)	(0.0261)	(0.0262)	(0.0164)		(0.0342)	(0.0342)	(0.0342)	(0.0224)
25-49 emp.		0.00273	0.00319	0.00272	0.00779		-0.0462	-0.0458	-0.0462	-0.0366
		(0.0284)	(0.0283)	(0.0284)	(0.0193)		(0.0377)	(0.0378)	(0.0378)	(0.0259)
50-99 emp.		-0.0405*	-0.0405*	-0.0407*	-0.0300*		-0.0718**	-0.0719**	-0.0721**	-0.0457*
		(0.0241)	(0.0241)	(0.0241)	(0.0160)		(0.0358)	(0.0358)	(0.0358)	(0.0246)
100-249 emp.		-0.0533**	-0.0534**	-0.0535**	-0.0274*		-0.0635*	-0.0635*	-0.0637*	-0.0363
		(0.0219)	(0.0218)	(0.0218)	(0.0157)		(0.0345)	(0.0345)	(0.0345)	(0.0240)
250-499 emp.		-0.0572**	-0.0566**	-0.0569**	-0.0322**		-0.0794**	-0.0789**	-0.0790**	-0.080***
		(0.0224)	(0.0223)	(0.0223)	(0.0161)		(0.0365)	(0.0365)	(0.0365)	(0.0237)
500-1499 emp.		-0.0393	-0.0389	-0.0390	-0.0296*		-0.0643*	-0.0639*	-0.0639*	-0.063***

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	(0.0252)	(0.0251)	(0.0251)	(0.0164)		(0.0355)	(0.0355)	(0.0355)	(0.0239)
>1499 emp.	-0.0413*	-0.0406*	-0.0410*	-0.0153		-0.0413	-0.0407	-0.0409	-0.0335
	(0.0219)	(0.0218)	(0.0218)	(0.0169)		(0.0355)	(0.0355)	(0.0355)	(0.0249)
1-5 years seniority	-0.0280**	-0.0274**	-0.0276**	-0.034***		-0.0466**	-0.0461**	-0.0461**	-0.039***
	(0.0130)	(0.0130)	(0.0130)	(0.00956)		(0.0181)	(0.0181)	(0.0181)	(0.0128)
>5 years seniority	-0.038***	-0.038***	-0.038***	-0.036***		-0.0386*	-0.0384*	-0.0384*	-0.0374**
	(0.0140)	(0.0140)	(0.0140)	(0.0105)		(0.0216)	(0.0216)	(0.0215)	(0.0146)
Wholesale, retail, transport, hospitality	0.0117	0.0127	0.0124	0.0118		0.0292	0.0299	0.0300	0.0330**
	(0.0144)	(0.0146)	(0.0146)	(0.00962)		(0.0247)	(0.0248)	(0.0248)	(0.0165)
Other services	0.00788	0.00846	0.00828	0.0161*		0.00806	0.00851	0.00852	0.0152
	(0.0135)	(0.0136)	(0.0136)	(0.00932)		(0.0233)	(0.0234)	(0.0234)	(0.0155)
Aragon	-0.00829	-0.00809	-0.00814	0.0339		0.0664	0.0665	0.0665	0.0762**
	(0.0233)	(0.0232)	(0.0232)	(0.0238)		(0.0509)	(0.0509)	(0.0509)	(0.0352)
Asturias	-0.0318**	-0.0316**	-0.0315**	0.0166		0.0360	0.0361	0.0362	0.0360
	(0.0151)	(0.0149)	(0.0149)	(0.0299)		(0.0749)	(0.0748)	(0.0748)	(0.0452)
Balearic Islands	0.0175	0.0171	0.0173	0.0381		0.0255	0.0252	0.0253	0.0295
	(0.0274)	(0.0275)	(0.0274)	(0.0243)		(0.0427)	(0.0428)	(0.0428)	(0.0316)
Canary Islands	-0.00625	-0.00755	-0.00707	-0.0167		-0.0280	-0.0290	-0.0289	-0.0361*
	(0.0257)	(0.0256)	(0.0256)	(0.0133)		(0.0358)	(0.0357)	(0.0357)	(0.0214)
Cantabria	-0.0320**	-0.0312**	-0.0314**	-0.035***		0.0228	0.0234	0.0234	-0.00719
	(0.0143)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)	(0.0101)		(0.0769)	(0.0764)	(0.0764)	(0.0536)
Castile and León	-0.035***	-0.036***	-0.036***	-0.0195		-0.0185	-0.0191	-0.0194	-0.0226
	(0.0119)	(0.0121)	(0.0121)	(0.0134)		(0.0363)	(0.0366)	(0.0366)	(0.0231)
Castilla-La Mancha	0.00559	0.00579	0.00591	0.000979		0.00767	0.00782	0.00805	0.0114
	(0.0213)	(0.0211)	(0.0212)	(0.0151)		(0.0336)	(0.0336)	(0.0336)	(0.0250)
Catalonia	0.0369**	0.0373**	0.0373**	0.0297**		0.0147	0.0150	0.0151	0.0208
	(0.0166)	(0.0166)	(0.0166)	(0.0117)		(0.0225)	(0.0225)	(0.0224)	(0.0162)
Valencia	0.0119	0.0119	0.0122	0.00577		0.0134	0.0134	0.0137	0.0114
	(0.0190)	(0.0190)	(0.0190)	(0.0129)		(0.0281)	(0.0281)	(0.0281)	(0.0193)
Extremadura	-0.037***	-0.036***	-0.036***	-0.00866		-0.0572	-0.0575	-0.0573	-0.073***
	(0.0135)	(0.0134)	(0.0134)	(0.0221)		(0.0357)	(0.0359)	(0.0359)	(0.0194)
Galicia	0.0508	0.0495	0.0502	0.0133		0.0245	0.0236	0.0238	-0.0106
	(0.0324)	(0.0324)	(0.0324)	(0.0180)		(0.0389)	(0.0390)	(0.0390)	(0.0232)
Madrid	0.00179	0.00206	0.00208	0.00345		0.00407	0.00429	0.00441	0.00809
	(0.0129)	(0.0129)	(0.0129)	(0.0102)		(0.0218)	(0.0218)	(0.0218)	(0.0155)
Murcia	-0.00277	-0.00271	-0.00245	0.0149		0.0185	0.0185	0.0189	0.00566
	(0.0268)	(0.0266)	(0.0267)	(0.0234)		(0.0436)	(0.0437)	(0.0436)	(0.0314)
Navarre	0.0120	0.0132	0.0126	0.0128		0.0379	0.0388	0.0387	0.0642
	(0.0363)	(0.0360)	(0.0362)	(0.0269)		(0.0602)	(0.0599)	(0.0599)	(0.0481)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
La Rioja	0.0276	0.0262	0.0272	0.00935		0.0484	0.0473	0.0479	0.000225	
	(0.0577)	(0.0570)	(0.0572)	(0.0329)		(0.0843)	(0.0842)	(0.0842)	(0.0491)	
Ceuta and Melilla	-0.046***	-0.045***	-0.045***	-0.042***		-0.072***	-0.072***	-0.072***	-0.080***	
	(0.0168)	(0.0161)	(0.0164)	(0.0123)		(0.0272)	(0.0271)	(0.0271)	(0.0185)	
Running variable squared				-0.00329					-0.00381	
				(0.00320)					(0.00487)	
Constant	0.061***	0.061**	0.0913**	0.0744**	0.054***	0.131***	0.166***	0.189***	0.181***	0.125***
	(0.0137)	(0.0289)	(0.0365)	(0.0325)	(0.0207)	(0.0190)	(0.0536)	(0.0622)	(0.0572)	(0.0351)
Observations	1,812	1,812	1,812	1,812	3,488	1,812	1,812	1,812	1,812	3,488
R-squared	0.003	0.048	0.049	0.048	0.031	0.003	0.025	0.026	0.026	0.024

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A4.4: ESTIMATION RESULTS OF REGRESSIONS ON THE WORKING HOURS REDUCTION COEFFICIENT AT THE SIXTH MONTH (REGRESSIONS 1-5) AND THE TWELFTH MONTH (REGRESSIONS 6-10), FATHERS

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Running variable	0.00575	0.00556	0.000350	0.00443	0.000953	0.0046**	0.00407*	-0.000416	0.00316	-0.00149*
	(0.00366)	(0.00364)	(0.00922)	(0.00437)	(0.00155)	(0.00223)	(0.00218)	(0.00371)	(0.00219)	(0.00079)
Treat	-0.0173*	-0.0145	-0.00777	-0.0108	-0.00436	-0.0230**	-0.0177	-0.0108	-0.0118	0.00515
	(0.0102)	(0.0101)	(0.0154)	(0.0128)	(0.00793)	(0.0112)	(0.0108)	(0.0120)	(0.0112)	(0.00762)
Interac			0.00639					0.00679		
			(0.00981)					(0.00462)		
30-35		-0.0191	-0.0190	-0.0189	-0.00249		-0.00900	-0.00867	-0.00850	-0.00742
		(0.0133)	(0.0134)	(0.0135)	(0.00874)		(0.0115)	(0.0116)	(0.0116)	(0.00791)
35-40		-0.0213	-0.0210	-0.0210	-0.0101		-0.0168	-0.0163	-0.0161	-0.0145*
		(0.0131)	(0.0132)	(0.0132)	(0.00820)		(0.0111)	(0.0112)	(0.0112)	(0.00778)
>40		-0.0225	-0.0221	-0.0221	-0.00285		-0.00768	-0.00736	-0.00723	-0.0115
		(0.0137)	(0.0138)	(0.0138)	(0.00930)		(0.0122)	(0.0122)	(0.0122)	(0.00813)
Native		-0.00500	-0.00504	-0.00505	-0.00839		-0.00647	-0.00649	-0.00644	-0.00318
		(0.00974)	(0.00974)	(0.00974)	(0.00759)		(0.00887)	(0.00887)	(0.00886)	(0.00596)
Indef. PT		0.045***	0.045***	0.0450***	0.048***		0.059***	0.059***	0.059***	0.073***
		(0.0172)	(0.0173)	(0.0172)	(0.0131)		(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0113)
Temp. FT		0.00113	0.00125	0.00121	0.00393		0.0113**	0.0114**	0.0115**	0.011***
		(0.00485)	(0.00482)	(0.00482)	(0.00352)		(0.00496)	(0.00496)	(0.00495)	(0.00343)
Temp. PT		0.0398**	0.0398**	0.0399**	0.04***		0.077***	0.077***	0.077***	0.074***
		(0.0181)	(0.0181)	(0.0181)	(0.0134)		(0.0174)	(0.0174)	(0.0174)	(0.0123)

Public sector	-0.00388	-0.00398	-0.00402	-0.0155	-9.68e-05	0.000363	0.000621	-0.00690
	(0.0151)	(0.0151)	(0.0150)	(0.0113)	(0.0153)	(0.0153)	(0.0153)	(0.0111)
1-4 emp.	-0.0129	-0.0128	-0.0129	-0.00771	-0.0244	-0.0243	-0.0245	0.00808
	(0.0161)	(0.0161)	(0.0161)	(0.0118)	(0.0157)	(0.0157)	(0.0157)	(0.0114)
5-9 emp.	-0.0135	-0.0138	-0.0138	-0.00838	-0.0216	-0.0218	-0.0219	-0.00720
	(0.0164)	(0.0164)	(0.0165)	(0.0119)	(0.0160)	(0.0160)	(0.0160)	(0.0106)
10-24 emp.	-0.0120	-0.0121	-0.0122	-0.00801	-0.0220	-0.0219	-0.0219	-0.00922
	(0.0153)	(0.0152)	(0.0152)	(0.0109)	(0.0147)	(0.0147)	(0.0147)	(0.00949)
25-49 emp.	-0.0110	-0.0110	-0.0110	-0.0138	-0.0284**	-0.0283**	-0.0285**	-0.0102
	(0.0150)	(0.0150)	(0.0150)	(0.0102)	(0.0140)	(0.0140)	(0.0140)	(0.00947)
50-99 emp.	-0.0138	-0.0137	-0.0138	-0.00319	-0.0297**	-0.0299**	-0.0303**	-0.0228**
	(0.0155)	(0.0156)	(0.0156)	(0.0120)	(0.0146)	(0.0146)	(0.0146)	(0.00899)
100-249 emp.	-0.00387	-0.00402	-0.00403	-0.00643	-0.0297**	-0.0297**	-0.0298**	-0.0158*
	(0.0154)	(0.0154)	(0.0154)	(0.0107)	(0.0136)	(0.0136)	(0.0136)	(0.00891)
250-499 emp.	-0.0144	-0.0143	-0.0143	-0.0163	-0.0342**	-0.0340**	-0.0341**	-0.0229**
	(0.0153)	(0.0153)	(0.0153)	(0.0102)	(0.0143)	(0.0143)	(0.0143)	(0.00925)
500-1499 emp.	-0.00283	-0.00330	-0.00325	-0.00759	-0.0219	-0.0222	-0.0224	-0.00260
	(0.0178)	(0.0177)	(0.0178)	(0.0120)	(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0109)
>1499 emp.	-0.0247	-0.0248	-0.0248	-0.0152	-0.0349**	-0.0352**	-0.0354**	-0.0195*
	(0.0154)	(0.0155)	(0.0155)	(0.0110)	(0.0147)	(0.0147)	(0.0147)	(0.00998)
1-5 years seniority	-0.0149*	-0.0150*	-0.0149*	-0.015***	-0.025***	-0.026***	-0.026***	-0.025***
	(0.00772)	(0.00776)	(0.00775)	(0.00574)	(0.00732)	(0.00732)	(0.00732)	(0.00520)
>5 years seniority	-0.0148*	-0.0149*	-0.0149*	-0.016***	-0.029***	-0.029***	-0.029***	-0.029***
	(0.00757)	(0.00761)	(0.00761)	(0.00586)	(0.00750)	(0.00750)	(0.00750)	(0.00526)
Wholesale, retail, transport, hospitality	0.026***	0.026***	0.026***	0.018***	0.026***	0.026***	0.026***	0.021***
	(0.00629)	(0.00630)	(0.00630)	(0.00418)	(0.00594)	(0.00595)	(0.00595)	(0.00430)
Other services	0.0135**	0.0136**	0.0136**	0.015***	0.0139**	0.0140**	0.0140**	0.0094**
	(0.00563)	(0.00561)	(0.00561)	(0.00442)	(0.00568)	(0.00568)	(0.00568)	(0.00421)
Aragon	-0.0223**	-0.0223**	-0.0224**	-0.00702	-0.0113	-0.0110	-0.0110	-0.0136
	(0.00930)	(0.00932)	(0.00932)	(0.00970)	(0.0132)	(0.0132)	(0.0132)	(0.0102)
Asturias	0.00677	0.00727	0.00722	0.0130	0.0152	0.0154	0.0152	-0.00129
	(0.0295)	(0.0294)	(0.0294)	(0.0215)	(0.0263)	(0.0263)	(0.0263)	(0.0156)
Balearic Islands	-0.029***	-0.028***	-0.029***	-0.023***	-0.0208	-0.0214	-0.0216	-0.0244**
	(0.00940)	(0.00941)	(0.00942)	(0.00608)	(0.0145)	(0.0144)	(0.0144)	(0.00958)
Canary Islands	-0.0207	-0.0203	-0.0205	-0.00445	-0.0222	-0.0224	-0.0225	-0.0164
	(0.0165)	(0.0165)	(0.0165)	(0.0130)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)	(0.0139)	(0.0112)
Cantabria	-0.0262**	-0.0268**	-0.0267**	-0.0153**	-0.029***	-0.030***	-0.031***	-0.030***
	(0.0120)	(0.0122)	(0.0122)	(0.00714)	(0.00992)	(0.00987)	(0.00991)	(0.00687)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Castile and León		-0.00946	-0.00947	-0.00943	-0.0109		-0.00144	-0.00175	-0.00186	-0.0109
		(0.0150)	(0.0150)	(0.0150)	(0.00811)		(0.0146)	(0.0146)	(0.0147)	(0.00953)
Castilla-La Mancha		-0.0204	-0.0203	-0.0203	-0.00367		-0.0150	-0.0149	-0.0150	-0.0188**
		(0.0144)	(0.0144)	(0.0144)	(0.0120)		(0.0136)	(0.0136)	(0.0136)	(0.00926)
Catalonia		-0.00786	-0.00783	-0.00786	0.000272		0.00403	0.00449	0.00466	-0.00250
		(0.0112)	(0.0112)	(0.0112)	(0.00765)		(0.00985)	(0.00985)	(0.00987)	(0.00708)
Valencia		-0.00807	-0.00813	-0.00812	0.00176		-0.00146	-0.00131	-0.00129	-0.0157**
		(0.0127)	(0.0127)	(0.0127)	(0.00926)		(0.0114)	(0.0114)	(0.0114)	(0.00746)
Extremadura		-0.038***	-0.037***	-0.037***	-0.021***		-0.036***	-0.035***	-0.035***	-0.042***
		(0.0106)	(0.0105)	(0.0105)	(0.00629)		(0.00829)	(0.00825)	(0.00824)	(0.00623)
Galicia		0.00413	0.00407	0.00404	-0.00246		0.00932	0.00958	0.00968	0.00860
		(0.0196)	(0.0196)	(0.0196)	(0.0110)		(0.0165)	(0.0165)	(0.0165)	(0.0123)
Madrid		-0.0218**	-0.0218**	-0.0218**	-0.00707		-0.00921	-0.00920	-0.00918	-0.0110
		(0.0103)	(0.0103)	(0.0103)	(0.00715)		(0.00941)	(0.00941)	(0.00940)	(0.00690)
Murcia		0.00121	0.00113	0.00119	-0.00581		-0.027***	-0.028***	-0.029***	-0.0116
		(0.0211)	(0.0211)	(0.0211)	(0.0113)		(0.0101)	(0.0101)	(0.0101)	(0.0104)
Navarre		-0.0227**	-0.0228**	-0.0228**	-0.00251		-0.0133	-0.0138	-0.0140	0.00438
		(0.00977)	(0.00983)	(0.00984)	(0.0147)		(0.0154)	(0.0154)	(0.0153)	(0.0183)
La Rioja		-0.0238**	-0.0237**	-0.0237**	-0.0192**		-0.034***	-0.032***	-0.032***	-0.0119
		(0.0120)	(0.0118)	(0.0118)	(0.00879)		(0.0124)	(0.0124)	(0.0124)	(0.0224)
Ceuta and Melilla		-0.0256**	-0.0261**	-0.0258**	-0.023***		-0.043***	-0.044***	-0.044***	-0.052***
		(0.0127)	(0.0129)	(0.0129)	(0.00800)		(0.0114)	(0.0117)	(0.0117)	(0.00956)
Running variable squared				0.00102					0.00095*	
				(0.00194)					(0.00051)	
Constant	0.027***	0.059***	0.0510**	0.0546***	0.0347**	0.043***	0.075***	0.063***	0.065***	0.051***
	(0.00731)	(0.0196)	(0.0228)	(0.0210)	(0.0148)	(0.00717)	(0.0208)	(0.0221)	(0.0212)	(0.0133)
Observations	2,137	2,137	2,137	2,137	4,122	4,122	4,122	4,122	4,122	8,096
R-squared	0.001	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.032	0.001	0.048	0.049	0.049	0.047

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Running variable	4.139**	3.403**	5.263*	3.836**	-0.00873	1.501*	1.558**	3.129**	1.805**	-0.0816
	(1.711)	(1.639)	(3.172)	(1.738)	(0.641)	(0.837)	(0.747)	(1.304)	(0.767)	(0.283)
Treat	-9.880	-9.463	-12.17	-11.53	3.151	-4.586	-7.161*	-9.593**	-8.778**	0.113
	(7.167)	(6.817)	(7.837)	(7.284)	(4.882)	(4.435)	(3.989)	(4.281)	(4.107)	(2.831)
Interac			-2.581					-2.376		
			(3.731)					(1.592)		
30-35		4.766	4.844	4.847	0.956		15.32***	15.20***	15.18***	14.07***
		(5.435)	(5.434)	(5.433)	(3.855)		(4.062)	(4.071)	(4.073)	(2.819)
35-40		-1.275	-1.145	-1.133	-1.194		16.26***	16.08***	16.06***	13.13***
		(5.799)	(5.798)	(5.797)	(4.082)		(4.127)	(4.135)	(4.136)	(2.871)
>40		11.29	11.57	11.58	3.637		11.23**	11.12**	11.11**	7.473**
		(7.038)	(7.051)	(7.049)	(5.195)		(4.421)	(4.429)	(4.430)	(3.074)
Native		11.75*	11.73*	11.71*	11.35**		5.120	5.127	5.111	7.091***
		(6.658)	(6.659)	(6.659)	(4.837)		(3.402)	(3.401)	(3.401)	(2.363)
Indef. PT		-1.194	-1.229	-1.240	-2.595		-0.784	-0.779	-0.774	0.231
		(4.401)	(4.404)	(4.404)	(3.190)		(2.988)	(2.990)	(2.990)	(2.110)
Temp. FT		-19.25***	-19.06***	-19.04***	-19.38***		-25.02***	-25.05***	-25.06***	-23.60***
		(4.573)	(4.579)	(4.581)	(3.330)		(2.242)	(2.244)	(2.244)	(1.591)
Temp. PT		-30.86***	-30.75***	-30.74***	-25.05***		-33.59***	-33.64***	-33.63***	-28.50***
		(5.789)	(5.791)	(5.789)	(4.179)		(5.239)	(5.239)	(5.239)	(3.640)
Public sector		23.57***	23.52***	23.51***	21.73***		21.44***	21.28***	21.25***	21.43***
		(6.011)	(6.015)	(6.014)	(4.319)		(4.223)	(4.222)	(4.220)	(3.080)
1-4 emp.		29.46***	29.47***	29.47***	30.91***		12.62**	12.59**	12.65**	13.51***
		(8.799)	(8.803)	(8.804)	(6.328)		(5.807)	(5.806)	(5.803)	(4.110)
5-9 emp.		28.39***	28.31***	28.32***	23.61***		18.15***	18.23***	18.25***	16.67***
		(9.907)	(9.913)	(9.915)	(6.848)		(5.661)	(5.663)	(5.661)	(4.095)
10-24 emp.		30.68***	30.64***	30.64***	30.28***		22.74***	22.67***	22.69***	21.50***
		(8.775)	(8.778)	(8.779)	(6.310)		(5.132)	(5.135)	(5.135)	(3.706)
25-49 emp.		31.13***	31.13***	31.11***	30.13***		19.92***	19.89***	19.94***	19.94***
		(9.008)	(9.012)	(9.012)	(6.335)		(5.281)	(5.282)	(5.280)	(3.806)
50-99 emp.		36.27***	36.20***	36.19***	35.00***		19.09***	19.17***	19.25***	21.44***
		(8.583)	(8.585)	(8.585)	(6.240)		(5.592)	(5.593)	(5.592)	(3.900)
100-249 emp.		35.62***	35.58***	35.57***	34.42***		19.59***	19.58***	19.61***	18.39***
		(8.251)	(8.257)	(8.258)	(5.994)		(5.292)	(5.295)	(5.295)	(3.839)
250-499 emp.		25.05***	25.07***	25.07***	28.51***		18.56***	18.48***	18.52***	18.83***
		(9.246)	(9.255)	(9.257)	(6.450)		(5.567)	(5.572)	(5.572)	(3.978)
500-1499 emp.		36.72***	36.65***	36.63***	34.29***		14.62***	14.74***	14.75***	14.75***

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	(8.501)	(8.507)	(8.509)	(6.137)		(5.643)	(5.646)	(5.644)	(4.100)
>1499 emp.	30.00***	29.96***	29.93***	27.11***		14.68***	14.78***	14.82***	17.09***
	(8.291)	(8.299)	(8.301)	(6.049)		(5.414)	(5.418)	(5.419)	(3.890)
1-5 years seniority	34.44***	34.48***	34.48***	40.68***		45.24***	45.28***	45.28***	42.75***
	(4.564)	(4.566)	(4.565)	(3.380)		(2.760)	(2.760)	(2.760)	(1.915)
>5 years seniority	46.17***	46.15***	46.13***	53.56***		48.44***	48.53***	48.53***	46.80***
	(5.002)	(5.002)	(5.002)	(3.639)		(2.762)	(2.768)	(2.768)	(1.912)
Wholesale, retail, transport, hospitality	-9.511	-9.463	-9.469	-10.47**		2.235	2.254	2.258	-1.132
	(6.659)	(6.658)	(6.659)	(4.551)		(2.478)	(2.478)	(2.478)	(1.748)
Other services	0.921	0.992	1.010	0.930		0.722	0.693	0.706	-1.004
	(6.291)	(6.292)	(6.292)	(4.209)		(2.562)	(2.563)	(2.563)	(1.820)
Aragon	-22.21**	-22.01**	-21.98**	-9.115		12.20**	12.09**	12.11**	11.41***
	(10.88)	(10.89)	(10.88)	(7.205)		(5.388)	(5.384)	(5.384)	(3.747)
Asturias	14.99	15.30	15.37	10.39		-3.067	-3.141	-3.080	-0.763
	(11.94)	(11.86)	(11.84)	(10.16)		(9.481)	(9.488)	(9.493)	(6.379)
Balearic Islands	-18.05*	-17.97*	-17.97*	-18.12**		-2.446	-2.228	-2.222	-5.514
	(10.36)	(10.34)	(10.34)	(7.701)		(6.965)	(6.934)	(6.938)	(4.802)
Canary Islands	6.039	6.197	6.272	9.653		4.513	4.580	4.598	2.106
	(8.849)	(8.875)	(8.879)	(6.583)		(6.154)	(6.155)	(6.157)	(4.194)
Cantabria	-18.05	-18.23	-18.34	-5.069		6.970	7.243	7.330	12.15**
	(26.01)	(26.09)	(26.10)	(15.52)		(9.061)	(9.020)	(9.018)	(5.161)
Castile and León	0.257	0.347	0.371	4.265		7.410	7.518	7.523	4.025
	(9.338)	(9.365)	(9.372)	(6.950)		(5.197)	(5.206)	(5.207)	(3.773)
Castilla-La Mancha	-25.84***	-25.90***	-25.91***	-15.93**		8.063	8.036	8.066	3.746
	(9.844)	(9.841)	(9.839)	(6.869)		(5.308)	(5.314)	(5.312)	(3.881)
Catalonia	2.044	2.118	2.113	7.949**		10.47***	10.31***	10.30***	9.431***
	(5.328)	(5.330)	(5.330)	(4.013)		(3.329)	(3.335)	(3.336)	(2.329)
Valencia	-9.784	-9.613	-9.585	-7.363		5.511	5.462	5.467	5.952**
	(7.024)	(7.030)	(7.032)	(5.285)		(4.250)	(4.250)	(4.251)	(2.879)
Extremadura	-24.83	-24.97	-24.91	-23.30**		-8.230	-8.288	-8.288	-3.127
	(16.76)	(16.77)	(16.78)	(10.62)		(9.822)	(9.803)	(9.803)	(6.397)
Galicia	13.12*	13.07*	13.14*	20.11***		9.707**	9.618**	9.610**	6.679*
	(7.713)	(7.712)	(7.715)	(5.361)		(4.796)	(4.796)	(4.793)	(3.550)
Madrid	4.292	4.360	4.386	11.46***		13.43***	13.43***	13.42***	10.97***
	(5.023)	(5.024)	(5.024)	(3.807)		(3.316)	(3.319)	(3.319)	(2.322)
Murcia	-14.61	-14.70	-14.69	-5.919		6.981	7.014	7.017	5.551
	(11.06)	(11.05)	(11.05)	(8.028)		(5.400)	(5.387)	(5.385)	(4.143)
Navarre	-4.732	-4.532	-4.529	-22.71**		0.629	0.781	0.798	-1.461
	(12.19)	(12.26)	(12.27)	(10.51)		(8.416)	(8.367)	(8.359)	(5.744)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
La Rioja		12.10	11.93	11.99	10.01		15.25	14.75	14.83	-1.257
		(16.92)	(16.85)	(16.83)	(13.09)		(14.11)	(14.03)	(14.06)	(10.79)
Ceuta and Melilla		-2.351	-2.391	-2.496	-2.943		7.315	7.576	7.466	11.45
		(22.42)	(22.59)	(22.59)	(21.42)		(15.49)	(15.47)	(15.47)	(8.882)
Running variable squared				-0.403					-0.257	
				(0.508)					(0.169)	
Constant	322.4***	262.1***	265.7***	264.8***	247.9***	341.0***	278.2***	282.4***	281.0***	278.6***
	(4.367)	(12.90)	(13.79)	(13.29)	(9.128)	(2.614)	(7.403)	(8.052)	(7.722)	(5.284)
Observations	2,626	2,626	2,626	2,626	5,120	4,122	4,122	4,122	4,122	8,096
R-squared	0.003	0.109	0.109	0.109	0.113	0.001	0.220	0.220	0.220	0.198

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE A4.6: ESTIMATION RESULTS OF REGRESSIONS ON THE PROPORTION OF INDIVIDUALS THAT TAKE PARENTAL LEAVE AFTER THE CHILDBIRTH FOR MOTHERS (REGRESSIONS 1-5) AND FATHERS (REGRESSIONS 6-10)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Running variable	-0.0114	-0.0124*	-0.00452	-0.0117	-0.00269	-6.61e-05	-0.000102	-0.00100	-0.000190	-0.000263
	(0.00709)	(0.00694)	(0.0134)	(0.00737)	(0.00256)	(0.00105)	(0.00110)	(0.00122)	(0.00103)	(0.00046)
Treat	0.0416	0.0388	0.0273	0.0356	0.00528	0.00651	0.00566	0.00705	0.00623	0.00644
	(0.0301)	(0.0294)	(0.0336)	(0.0314)	(0.0202)	(0.00540)	(0.00553)	(0.00491)	(0.00507)	(0.00412)
Interac			-0.0110					0.00136		
			(0.0158)					(0.00190)		
30-35		0.046***	0.046***	0.0461***	0.041***		-0.00147	-0.00140	-0.00142	-0.000996
		(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0172)	(0.0117)		(0.00480)	(0.00481)	(0.00481)	(0.00353)
35-40		0.065***	0.066***	0.0657***	0.065***		-0.00171	-0.00161	-0.00164	0.000583
		(0.0201)	(0.0201)	(0.0201)	(0.0136)		(0.00509)	(0.00514)	(0.00514)	(0.00378)
>40		-0.00373	-0.00252	-0.00327	0.00749		-0.00132	-0.00125	-0.00127	0.000551
		(0.0257)	(0.0258)	(0.0258)	(0.0170)		(0.00543)	(0.00546)	(0.00546)	(0.00397)
Native		0.0255	0.0254	0.0255	0.0260*		0.000152	0.000148	0.000155	-0.00190
		(0.0210)	(0.0210)	(0.0210)	(0.0137)		(0.00351)	(0.00351)	(0.00352)	(0.00321)
Indef. PT		0.0106	0.0104	0.0105	-0.00492		-0.00990*	-0.00991*	-0.00991*	-0.00633
		(0.0199)	(0.0200)	(0.0200)	(0.0137)		(0.00505)	(0.00505)	(0.00505)	(0.00406)
Temp. FT		-0.050***	-0.049***	-0.049***	-0.059***		0.00185	0.00187	0.00187	-0.00299
		(0.0180)	(0.0180)	(0.0180)	(0.0123)		(0.00329)	(0.00329)	(0.00329)	(0.00232)
Temp. PT		-0.0134	-0.0129	-0.0132	-0.0241*		0.00178	0.00181	0.00180	0.00394
		(0.0208)	(0.0208)	(0.0208)	(0.0145)		(0.00577)	(0.00577)	(0.00577)	(0.00508)

Public sector	-0.0144	-0.0146	-0.0145	0.00888	0.0220	0.0220	0.0220	0.0157*
	(0.0279)	(0.0279)	(0.0279)	(0.0203)	(0.0135)	(0.0135)	(0.0135)	(0.00853)
1-4 emp.	-0.0361	-0.0360	-0.0360	-0.0304**	-0.00225	-0.00223	-0.00226	-0.00502
	(0.0230)	(0.0230)	(0.0230)	(0.0142)	(0.00446)	(0.00447)	(0.00446)	(0.00404)
5-9 emp.	-0.0219	-0.0222	-0.0220	0.00229	-0.00535	-0.00540	-0.00538	-0.00571
	(0.0266)	(0.0266)	(0.0266)	(0.0180)	(0.00371)	(0.00370)	(0.00369)	(0.00389)
10-24 emp.	0.0365	0.0364	0.0364	0.0414**	0.00460	0.00464	0.00462	-0.00115
	(0.0262)	(0.0262)	(0.0262)	(0.0177)	(0.00573)	(0.00574)	(0.00574)	(0.00423)
25-49 emp.	0.0533*	0.0533*	0.0533*	0.074***	-0.00183	-0.00181	-0.00183	-0.000126
	(0.0290)	(0.0290)	(0.0290)	(0.0197)	(0.00476)	(0.00477)	(0.00476)	(0.00465)
50-99 emp.	0.097***	0.096***	0.0966***	0.075***	0.00239	0.00235	0.00234	-0.00218
	(0.0316)	(0.0316)	(0.0316)	(0.0200)	(0.00602)	(0.00601)	(0.00601)	(0.00457)
100-249 emp.	0.103***	0.103***	0.103***	0.096***	-0.00119	-0.00119	-0.00120	-0.00221
	(0.0293)	(0.0293)	(0.0293)	(0.0193)	(0.00546)	(0.00546)	(0.00546)	(0.00443)
250-499 emp.	0.0778**	0.0779**	0.0778**	0.078***	0.00454	0.00458	0.00455	0.00901
	(0.0314)	(0.0313)	(0.0314)	(0.0215)	(0.00712)	(0.00713)	(0.00713)	(0.00649)
500-1499 emp.	0.0642**	0.0639**	0.0640**	0.096***	-0.00296	-0.00303	-0.00301	0.00161
	(0.0291)	(0.0291)	(0.0291)	(0.0204)	(0.00668)	(0.00666)	(0.00666)	(0.00571)
>1499 emp.	0.113***	0.113***	0.113***	0.126***	0.00738	0.00732	0.00733	0.00821
	(0.0292)	(0.0292)	(0.0293)	(0.0207)	(0.00977)	(0.00976)	(0.00976)	(0.00681)
1-5 years seniority	0.051***	0.051***	0.0510***	0.059***	0.00307	0.00305	0.00306	0.0052**
	(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0158)	(0.0111)	(0.00311)	(0.00311)	(0.00311)	(0.00260)
>5 years seniority	0.0376*	0.0376*	0.0376*	0.0301**	0.00385	0.00380	0.00382	0.00139
	(0.0199)	(0.0199)	(0.0199)	(0.0134)	(0.00364)	(0.00364)	(0.00365)	(0.00281)
Wholesale, retail, transport, hospitality	0.0244	0.0246	0.0244	0.000529	0.00388	0.00387	0.00387	0.00184
	(0.0247)	(0.0247)	(0.0247)	(0.0172)	(0.00313)	(0.00314)	(0.00313)	(0.00252)
Other services	0.0565**	0.0568**	0.0566**	0.0412**	0.00486	0.00488	0.00487	0.00330
	(0.0242)	(0.0242)	(0.0242)	(0.0170)	(0.00335)	(0.00335)	(0.00335)	(0.00281)
Aragon	0.123***	0.124***	0.123***	0.079***	0.00543	0.00549	0.00547	-0.000329
	(0.0472)	(0.0472)	(0.0473)	(0.0295)	(0.0116)	(0.0116)	(0.0116)	(0.00797)
Asturias	0.0249	0.0262	0.0254	0.00334	0.00632	0.00636	0.00632	0.00326
	(0.0634)	(0.0635)	(0.0635)	(0.0384)	(0.0156)	(0.0156)	(0.0156)	(0.0109)
Balearic Islands	0.0850**	0.0854**	0.0851**	0.0501*	-0.0095**	-0.0096**	-0.0096**	-0.00444
	(0.0400)	(0.0400)	(0.0400)	(0.0261)	(0.00399)	(0.00404)	(0.00403)	(0.00642)
Canary Islands	-0.068***	-0.067***	-0.068***	-0.058***	0.0105	0.0105	0.0105	0.00127
	(0.0224)	(0.0225)	(0.0225)	(0.0172)	(0.0122)	(0.0122)	(0.0122)	(0.00760)
Cantabria	0.0911	0.0903	0.0906	0.0798	0.0287	0.0285	0.0285	0.0200
	(0.0789)	(0.0787)	(0.0789)	(0.0529)	(0.0399)	(0.0398)	(0.0398)	(0.0227)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Castile and León		0.131***	0.132***	0.132***	0.093***		0.00224	0.00218	0.00220	-0.00281
		(0.0440)	(0.0440)	(0.0440)	(0.0296)		(0.00901)	(0.00903)	(0.00903)	(0.00612)
Castilla-La Mancha		0.103***	0.103***	0.103***	0.111***		-0.0088**	-0.0088**	-0.0089**	-0.0088**
		(0.0387)	(0.0388)	(0.0387)	(0.0284)		(0.00374)	(0.00374)	(0.00374)	(0.00404)
Catalonia		0.0349*	0.0353*	0.0351*	0.0107		-0.00375	-0.00365	-0.00369	-0.00672*
		(0.0203)	(0.0203)	(0.0203)	(0.0141)		(0.00494)	(0.00492)	(0.00493)	(0.00383)
Valencia		0.079***	0.081***	0.080***	0.092***		-0.000323	-0.000295	-0.000307	-0.00450
		(0.0269)	(0.0270)	(0.0271)	(0.0200)		(0.00619)	(0.00619)	(0.00619)	(0.00440)
Extremadura		-0.00764	-0.00825	-0.00777	-0.0215		0.00332	0.00336	0.00334	-0.00550
		(0.0429)	(0.0430)	(0.0430)	(0.0267)		(0.0127)	(0.0127)	(0.0127)	(0.00705)
Galicia		-0.00761	-0.00781	-0.00758	-0.0205		-0.0092**	-0.0092**	-0.0092**	-0.0085**
		(0.0302)	(0.0302)	(0.0302)	(0.0196)		(0.00390)	(0.00388)	(0.00389)	(0.00422)
Madrid		0.0411*	0.0414*	0.0413*	0.0268*		-0.00426	-0.00426	-0.00426	-0.00168
		(0.0214)	(0.0214)	(0.0214)	(0.0149)		(0.00540)	(0.00540)	(0.00539)	(0.00454)
Murcia		0.124***	0.124***	0.124***	0.117***		-0.0095**	-0.0096**	-0.0096**	-0.00848*
		(0.0477)	(0.0477)	(0.0477)	(0.0331)		(0.00404)	(0.00405)	(0.00405)	(0.00452)
Navarre		0.247***	0.248***	0.247***	0.318***		0.00588	0.00579	0.00582	0.00381
		(0.0717)	(0.0716)	(0.0717)	(0.0553)		(0.0151)	(0.0151)	(0.0151)	(0.0112)
La Rioja		-0.093***	-0.094***	-0.093***	-0.00968		-0.00658	-0.00629	-0.00643	0.0320
		(0.0206)	(0.0206)	(0.0206)	(0.0493)		(0.00453)	(0.00445)	(0.00449)	(0.0295)
Ceuta and Melilla		-0.00442	-0.00459	-0.00465	-0.0123		-0.0126**	-0.0127**	-0.0126**	-0.016***
		(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.0620)		(0.00513)	(0.00514)	(0.00513)	(0.00405)
Running variable squared				-0.000633					9.11e-05	
				(0.00212)					(0.00019)	
Constant	0.118***	-0.105**	-0.0894*	-0.101**	-0.0690**	0.00416	0.000686	-0.00175	-0.000321	0.00708
	(0.0181)	(0.0431)	(0.0487)	(0.0454)	(0.0289)	(0.00302)	(0.00745)	(0.00792)	(0.00778)	(0.00597)
Observations	2,626	2,626	2,626	2,626	5,120	4,122	4,122	4,122	4,122	8,096
R-squared	0.001	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.071	0.001	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.009

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$